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Abstract 
The European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) was presented by its drafters as an explicit constitution for 
the European Union (EU 25). A possible explanation for its rejection by the French and Dutch citizens 
in the course of spring 2005 is that it did not sufficiently amend the implicit constitution of the EU 25, 
the European Union Treaty (EUT), which was truly the object of voters’ aversion. Assuming this to be 
true, there should be a thorough debate on the relevance and viability of the de facto current 
constitution of the European Union. In this paper, we engage in this debate by identifying what is 
essentially wrong with the economic provisions of the EUT, which we designate as the “European 
economic constitution.” Using a constitutional political economy approach, we first attempt to 
demonstrate that both what we define as the “principle of integrity” and the “principle of efficiency” 
of collective action appear to be violated by the European economic constitution. This occurs, 
respectively, because its provisions are not neutral, nor revisable, and because they do not sufficiently 
allow for the possibility of cooperative collective decision (leading to convergence in welfare) in a 
more than ever numerous and heterogeneous EU. Our essential argument in this respect regards the 
implications of the structurally different economic performances and incentives of small and large 
countries under the European economic constitution. Finally, since the present European trade-off 
between “integrity” and “efficiency” appears sub-optimal, we present two original ways of achieving 
potentially better ones in the EU, through a “Great compromise” or “Economic constitution(s),” 
expressing a preference for the latter.  
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“On s'est beaucoup trop accoutumé dans les gouvernements à immoler toujours le bonheur des particuliers 
à de prétendus droits de la société. On oublie que la société est faite pour les particuliers; qu'elle n'est 
instituée que pour protéger les droits de tous, en assurant l'accomplissement de tous les devoirs mutuels.”  
 
                                  Anne Robert-Jacques Turgot, Discours à la Sorbonne, 27 novembre 1750. 
 
“If all nations were small and none were large, humanity would surely be freer and happier. But one 
cannot prevent the existence of great nations.” 
 
                                  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume I, Chapter VIII.
1 
 
 
 
1.  Prologue: Toward a unifying theory of European democracy 
 
 
Over the last ten years or so, two apparently consistent related sets of arguments have been 
developed in European studies to account for the European Union’s (EU) democratic 
shortcomings and unique “political system.”
2 
 
The first ensemble constitutes in our view the no-bridge theorem: stripped to the essential, it states 
that while Europe is one thing, democracy as we know it in the member states is another, and 
that thinking otherwise amounts to a composition fallacy. Two versions of that theorem coexist 
in the literature. The first one is positive: the EU is as democratic as it can be. It was sharply 
presented as a “defense of the ‘democratic deficit’” by Moravcsik (2002). The second one is 
normative: the EU should not be democratic. It was justified in Majone (1996) by the distinction 
between European Pareto-improving policies and national non Pareto-improving policies. In 
brief, the idea lying at the core of the no-bridge theorem is that since the EU, a non-state, is truly 
“new under the sun,” no past or current political criteria can be accurately used to assess its 
qualities, least of all those devised to evaluate qualities of national liberal democracies.
3 According 
to Majone (2005), this “analogical fallacy” between national and European political regimes 
                                                           
1 (New York: Library of America, new translation by Arthur Goldhammer, 2004) 182. We thank Art 
Goldhammer for the references of all Tocqueville quotations in this paper. 
2 This characterization is that of Hix (2005). 
3 Although apparently rigorous, the argument suffers from a problem of internal consistency not dissimilar 
to the parable of the borrowed kettle returned pierced narrated by Freud in Jokes and their Relation to the 
Unconscious (1905): (1) “I never borrowed a kettle from you” (“the democratic deficit does not exist”); (2) 
“I returned it to you un-pierced” (“it does exist but does not matter that much”); (3) “The kettle was 
already pierced when I got it from you” (“at least it is not worse at the EU level than within the member 
states”). The conclusion of Freud is that the kettle was returned pierced.   
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would be nothing less than the “most serious pitfall” threatening (s)he who studies the European 
Union. 
 
The second set of arguments, that we label the invisible hand theory, comes down to the idea that 
Europe works best without politics. Here again, two distinct ideas have been developed in the 
literature, embracing two historical ages of the European project. “Market Europe,” that was 
born out of pragmatic steps, is said to function more efficiently without the “fallacy of grand 
theorizing” – visions or “illusions” – and should steer clear of any conscious political integration, 
as undesirable as it is impossible (see Moravcsik, 2005a);
 4 “Moral Europe,” an anti-power in its 
essence, is a grand  dessein for the world rather than for itself, a “civilian power” heir to   
Christianity’s selflessness rather than Greeks’ “democratic politicization.”
5 The EU raison d’être in 
the contemporary period would thus be to benevolently spread democracy outward, integrating 
as many countries as possible even at the risk of centrifugal dissolution.
6 
 
In the light of the political economy shortcomings and failures of the European economic 
constitution, we reject both of those two sets of arguments. Europe and national liberal 
democracies can and must be reconciled through a political re-contracting between member 
states taking size into account, devised to improve accountability, efficiency and stability in the 
EU in years to come. 
 
In the context of the growing economic literature on the peculiar brand of federalism the EU 
exemplifies,
7 we try to adopt an original perspective in two respects: first, we develop our 
arguments about the EU using the constitutional political economy approach as a reference –
which is neither original nor new
8 – but applying it to the economic constitution of the EU; second, 
we consider the role of economic and political size in federal regimes, not from the external 
perspective – the question of the size of the EU (what is the critical size for the EU, what the EU 
                                                           
4 Here the external validity of the argument seems doubtful. The case for pragmatism on behalf of 
experience does not appear in line with some defining moments of European history. The conference of 
Messina (June 1955) actually witnessed the adoption of a global “grand plan” (the “Beyen plan”) instead 
of piecemeal “small steps” (the “Spaak plan”) and that approach framed the Treaty of Rome. It could be 
an example of how highly regarded European figures’ historical role (like Jean Monnet) might have been 
overestimated (Milward, 1992). But it is hardly an illustration of how grand planning was overplayed by 
pragmatism in the course of European integration.  
5 The expression was used by the philosopher Slavoj Žižek in an interview with Le Monde, 8 May 2005. 
6 See Leonard (2005) for a recent non-academic formulation of the argument. The question of the limits 
or borders of the EU is not addressed in the present paper.  
7 See Hix (2005) for a survey. 
8 See Mueller (2005) for a very recent survey.  
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should do that the member states shouldn’t, etc.., i.e. an absolute approach to size) – , but on the 
internal level, or the question of size within the EU (how does size matters within the EU, i.e. a 
comparative approach of size). Combining both perspectives, we are eventually able to propose 
some original ways forward for the EU out of its current political, economic and social 
predicament.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: the second section presents an interpretation of the French 
and Dutch referenda results and a clarification of the failures of the ECT regarding citizens 
demands; the third section defines the integrity-efficiency trade-off and its application to the EU; 
Section 4 attempts to delimitate the historical, geographical and analytical reality of the European 
economic constitution; Section 5 focuses on the issue of integrity; Section 6 substantiates the 
question of efficiency and sheds some light on a possible “size nexus” in the EU; finally, Section 
7 presents the ideas of the “Great compromise” and the “European economic constitution(s)” as 
ways to improve the European integrity-efficiency trade-off, expressing a preference for the 
latter.  
 
2. The ECT as a constitution and a non-constitutional event 
 
“The treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe...nothing to 
stabilize the new states of Europe...nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic 
solidarity amongst the Allies themselves...It is an extraordinary fact that the fundamental 
economic problem of a Europe starving and disintegrating...was the one question in which it was 
impossible to arouse...interest.” Those words of John Maynard Keynes published after the Treaty 
of Versailles was made public
9 resound with force in the aftermath of the ECT rejection by 
France and The Netherlands (respectively on the 29
th of May and 1
st of June 2005).  
 
While the fate of the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) is still officially undecided,
10 the 
“war of interpretation” over the meaning of the two referenda’s results is now well under way, 
                                                           
9 “Europe after the Treaty” in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1920). 
10 But it is legally settled by the unambiguous provisions of the ECT (see Article IV-447) and was 
politically confirmed by the decision of the British government to suspend the European Union Bill. The 
declaration issued at the end of the 16 and 17 June 2005 European Council, while implicit, is also 
straightforward. It states the (vague) need for a “period of reflection…used to enable a broad debate to 
take place” and asserts that “the recent developments do not call into question the validity of continuing 
with the ratification processes.” But it makes clear that “the timetable for the ratification in different 
Member States will be altered if necessary in response to these developments and according to the 
circumstances in these Member States.”   
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and many arguments have already made their way into the public debate.
11 Our position, which is 
the starting point of our reflection on the flaws of the European economic constitution, is that 
European citizens
12 wanted, and still want, a more democratic and efficient EU, but did not find 
in the ECT the answer to their concerns. The results of the July 2005 “Eurobarometer,” partly 
reproduced on Charts I to V, seems to give some credit to this interpretation.  
 
While the motives of French and Dutch citizens appear to be different, we draw three 
conclusions from the answers gathered: first, the rejection of the ECT can not be interpreted as 
the rejection of the European project or European integration, as shown in Charts I and II;
13  
 
[Charts I and II here] 
 
One should note, beside the overwhelming approval that the EU as an historical achievement 
enjoys, that an impressive majority of the citizens that voted “No” do support their country’s 
membership to the EU. 
 
Second, the “economic voting”, very clearly in the case of France (Chart III), in a more balanced 
way in the case of Netherlands (Chart IV), was dominant over sovereignty concerns (or 
“sovereignism”), which could indicate that citizens in both countries have reached a certain 
European political maturity, more than a decade after the Maastricht Treaty. French and Dutch 
voters now seem to make the EU accountable for what it should give them more than for what it 
can take away from them.
14 
 
[Chart III and IV here] 
 
                                                           
11 Some of which have been published in Prospect, n°112, July 2005. 
12 At least in France and the Netherlands where turnouts of respectively 70 percent and 62 percent made 
results all the more significant, not to mention the fact that both countries are among the founding 
members of the EEC and belong to the Euro area (see Section 6). 
13 Nor can it simplistically be interpreted as the expression of a xenophobic fear of Eastern Europeans 
and/or potential new member states like Turkey. The figure of the “Polish plumber” introduced in the 
French campaign by the ex-commissioner Frits Bolkestein is conspicuously absent from the portrait 
painted in Chart III & IV.  
14 In this respect another clarification is necessary. The argument according to which the predominant 
concern of citizens over national economic and social contexts would be unrelated to the EU does not 
hold. If citizens were convinced that the European project had little or nothing to do with the economic 
context of a founding member state participant in the Euro area, after close to five decade of economic 
integration and five years of monetary union, then they would be even more concerned about the EU.  
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Finally, this demand for Europe seems to take the form of a “demand for a constitution” 
(however general the term might be), which, when related to the actual results of both referenda, 
seems to point to the intuition that citizens are not happy with the current state of European 
institutions, a disaffection that was not appeased by the ECT (Chart V).  
 
[Chart V here] 
 
The results of the latest available edition of the Eurobarometer
15 point even more precisely in the 
same direction: while 63 percent of European citizens are in favor of a Constitution for the EU 
(60 percent believing it to be necessary to the good functioning of the EU), 49 percent of them 
thinks the ECT should be re-negotiated and 13 percent of them that it should be invalidated.  
 
Summing up, the referenda results show in our eyes that French and Dutch citizens, standing as a 
democratically significant sample of European citizens, enthusiastically embrace Europe, reject its 
current institutional form and/or performance in terms of democracy and welfare and aspire to 
better ones. Following this informed intuition, the first task we undertake is to briefly evaluate 
the innovations brought about by the ECT and show how little it actually did to amend the EUT.  
 
However tempted, one should not judge the text by its cover.
16 Of course, one could hardly help 
noticing on the first page of the draft version presented to the public in June 2003, later 
amended
17 before being signed by the 25 member states of the EU on October 29 2004 in Rome, 
that the term “Treaty” was much less visible than the word “Constitution.” Yet, constitutional 
law scholars seem to think otherwise, generally interpreting the ECT as a Treaty. One way to 
close the debate on the democratic qualities of the ECT right away would indeed be to assert that 
the ECT is simply not a Constitution and, given the results of the French and Dutch referenda, 
should never have been labeled so. It is, just like the text signed in Maastricht, a plain (and not so) 
simple Treaty.  
 
We don’t subscribe to this view. The necessary ambiguity of the EUTC, not a pure Treaty nor a 
perfect Constitution, echoes exactly the necessary ambiguity of the EU (characterized by Jacques 
Delors as a “Federation of Nation-States” and by Joseph Weiler as the land of “constitutional 
                                                           
15 Eurobarometer n°64 “Public opinion in the European Union” Oct.-Nov. 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_first_fr.pdf 
16 The version of the ECT referred to in this section is the English final version of the “Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe” published in the EU Official Journal C 310 of December 16 2004. 
17 In June 2004.   
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tolerance”). This ambiguity is apparently acknowledged by Weiler (2002) when the two criteria he 
suggests using to assess the “nature of the beast” each fall on one side of the fence.
18  
 
This ambiguity of the ECT can be demonstrated alternatively.  Its Part I states the values and 
objectives of the Union, its Part II defines its institutions and the balance of their respective 
powers, its Part III comprises the whole set of dispositions of earlier European Treaties regarding 
public policies (some directly applicable in member states), its Part IV finally defines the 
unanimous procedures necessary to revise the text. Therefore, the ECT can be said to be a Treaty 
(Part III) embedded in a Constitution (Part I, II and IV), or a Constitution (Part I, II, and III) 
embedded in a Treaty (Part IV). A constitutional Treaty, the ECT thus appears to be a rather 
accurate portrait of what the EU has become in terms of political regime, whatever the 
theoretical denomination.
19  
 
In consequence, it seems fair to say that not only did the ECT present itself as an explicit 
constitution but it actually was one. Unfortunately, however, it was not a good enough 
constitution, that would have amended in depth the existing one, the European Union Treaty 
(EUT).
20 But the text framed by the European Convention
21  seems to mark a number of 
significant positive steps on the path of a much-needed democratization
22 and institutional 
reform of the European Union, now comprising 25 members.
23  
 
To begin with, the second part of the text, the so-called “Charter of Fundamental Rights” (or EU 
Bill of Rights), should not be treated lightly, especially by those who have been complaining for 
                                                           
18 According to Weiler (2002) the unanimity required for its revision would make the ECT a Treaty, but 
the public and fairly democratic conventional process that led to its drafting makes it more of a 
Constitution (see footnote 21).  
19 See Hix (2005) for a clear theoretical survey. 
20 The version of the EUT referred to in this section and onward is the consolidated version of the Treaty 
of the European Community as of December 2002. 
21 The European Convention, also known as the “Convention on the future of Europe,” was convened by 
the Laeken Declaration of 15 December 2001 to make the EU “more democratic, more transparent and 
more efficient.” It held its sessions from February 28 2002 until July 10 2003. It was composed of one 
president and two vice-president (nominated), fifteen representatives of the heads of state or government 
of the member states (one from each member state), thirteen representatives of the heads of state or 
government of the candidate states (one  per  candidate state), thirty representatives of the national 
parliaments of the member states (two from each member state), twenty-six representatives of the national 
parliaments of the candidate states (two from each candidate state), sixteen members of the European 
Parliament, two representatives of the European Commission, for a total of one hundred and five tenured 
members. Since one hundred out of them were elected members of parliaments (national and European) 
and national governments, we hold the European convention to have been a fairly democratic assembly, 
both as a “demos” and as a representative body of European peoples. 
22 For a general assessment of the state of democracy in the EU, see Fitoussi & Laurent (2004) and (2005). 
23 Since May 1 2004.  
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many years that the European project was exclusively about deregulating, liberalizing or 
privatizing. Neither, though, should it be see, as it was sometimes emphatically as a constraint on 
member states social legislation establishing mandatory new rights for workers. It has no such 
binding power, as the UK government made it very clear in the text in the course of the June 
2004 negotiation and final agreement.
24  
 
The new enhanced role given in the text to the European Parliament (elected by European citizens 
since 1979) should not as well be underestimated, notably with regard to its relations with the 
European Commission, the most powerful body of the EU together with the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the Court of Justice of the European Communities, all members of which 
remain not elected in the ECT.  
 
Important institutional reforms of the executive branch
25 were also elaborated and proposed by 
the Convention’s delegates. In the new system, the Presidency of the European Council of the 
EU
26 would be more stable and legitimate, a “Union Minister for Foreign affairs” would be 
nominated and finally, the power of the Eurogroup would be strengthened (cf. infra). Here again 
however, one should keep in mind that such reforms did do not go without serious limitations,
27 
part of which were actually introduced in the course of the intergovernmental conference 
negotiations (ICG).  
 
Whatever the limits of the ECT, inherent to any constitutional process implying bargaining and 
compromise, one should thus acknowledge that the delegates have sincerely tried to improve the 
EU system in the context of an unprecedentedly arduous negotiation. Symbolically, the ECT was 
a success. Some important reforms contained in it could actually well be implemented, even if the 
text as a whole will never come into force. But what the ECT left untouched, as Keynes 
                                                           
24 One can refer on this point to the Article II-111 of the ECT: “1. The provisions of this Charter are 
addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore 
respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their 
respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the other 
Parts of the Constitution. 2. This Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond 
the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks 
defined in the other Parts of the Constitution.” 
25 This denomination is almost an abuse of language since the EU system actually relies on a confusion of 
powers and a separation of legitimacies, see Laurent & Le Cacheux (2003a).  
26 Not to be confused with the Council of Ministers referred to in the text as the “Council” (Article I-19).  
27 To mention just one, foreign affairs were still submitted in the ECT to the unanimity rule. It was thus 
hard to figure out what exactly would the “Union Minister” (ad)minister, see Laurent and Le Cacheux 
(2003a).  
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suggested for the Treaty of Versailles, was perhaps one of the greatest concern of European 
citizens and ultimately, as we have tried to show, the very reason of their discontent: the unfair 
and inefficient European economic constitution.  
 
 
3. What should a democratic economic constitution do?  
 
What, fundamentally, is a democratic economic constitution? What should it do? What essential 
features should it be given to guarantee citizens the greatest possible equity and welfare in the 
long run? The simple but powerful models that political economists have forged over the last 
century can be used to provide an answer to this question.
28 Constitutional political economy,
29 in 
particular, proves an inspiring theoretical framework to assess the qualities of economic 
fundamental laws.
30 We first follow the Buchanan & Tullock (1962) intuition of an “efficiency-
integrity trade-off,” which we then adapt to the EU. In doing so, we acknowledge doing much 
more than just adapting their original framework, which was not designed to account for 
collective constitutional choices within complex polities like the EU. Using it as a reference more 
than a framework, we really interpret it more than we apply it.
31 
 
If the question is the choice of a good constitutional rule, then the very first condition for a 
constitutional choice to take place is that individuals find it useful to replace private rules by 
collective rules, because the un-checked action of others can harm them. More positively, 
individuals engage in constitutional processes because they feel they can derive a benefit form it, 
as opposed to the situation of autarchy. In a democratic regime, where one is concerned by 
establishing the closest correspondence possible between citizens’ preferences and policy 
outputs, economic constitutional provisions still have to reflect a trade-off between two partly 
contradictory requirements. The first is the necessity to allow for, and even encourage, a process 
of aggregating individuals’ preferences. Such a process supposes the establishment and 
enforcement of rules that ideally prevent citizens from blocking the system at any time and give 
                                                           
28 The modern economic analysis of constitutions can be traced back to Wicksell (1896) and has been 
given a new impetus with the seminal work of Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Many contributions have 
enriched the field since, see Breton, Salmon & Wintrobe (2000) for an overview and a European 
perspective.  
29 The concept was coined by Brennan & Buchanan (1988).  
30 Although it was originally designed to assess the political fundamental laws qualities within the 
framework of economic analysis.  
31 This clarification appears necessary especially since the founding contributors of the constitutional 
political economy approach have themselves exposed their views on the European constitutional process 
(see for instance Blankart & Mueller, 2004). We try to explain why and how they sharply differ from ours 
in Section 5.   
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them strong incentives to opt for co-operative and mutually beneficial strategies, when they 
appear desirable for the political community formed by the interdependent members. Those rules 
should conversely deter participants from choosing individual interests over the common welfare, 
when their individual, opportunistic behaviors can have collectively harmful consequences. Such 
is what we propose to call the “principle of efficiency” of collective action in constitutional 
processes.  
 
But this imperative does not stand alone. The related ambition of any fundamental law is to 
protect in the long-run minorities against possible abuses by deciding majorities. This implies 
designing limits to collective action, such as thresholds so high that veto power is always possible 
when vital outcomes are at stake, whenever the participant finds her/himself in the minority. We 
propose to call this property of constitutional rules the “principle of integrity.”  
 
It is well known that, for instance, the rule of unanimity allows every party to the political process 
to defend its interest at any time but does only exceptionally allow for collective action, actually 
limited to Pareto-improving choices provided they are perceived as such by individuals. 
Reciprocally, majority rules can make punctual decisions much easier, but expose minorities to 
majorities’ arbitrary decisions.
32 Consequently, the “democratically optimal” constitution can be 
said to be the one that secures “efficiency in integrity.”
33  
 
In order to precisely substantiate these two principles, we have to make another important 
clarification in our version of the constitutional political economy approach. To us, in the EU as 
it is, economic constitutional choices are originally and eventually made by States, not by citizens 
(even if they are afterwards offered the possibility to validate or reject them). Hence, the 
democratic unit of the EU in a positive constitutional perspective is the State, not the citizen. 
This is consistent with the fact that the “European people” (and therefore the “European 
sovereignty”) does not exist,
  34 and we do not intend in this paper to give it any theoretical 
content. Our concern is thus with the democratic and mutually beneficial coexistence of diverse 
national welfare states.  
 
                                                           
32 Not to mention the classical limitations of simple majority rules, such as the Arrow’s (1951)   
impossibility theorems and the related literature on the risk of cyclical majorities (see, inter al., DeMeyer & 
Plott, 1970). 
33 Following Plott (1991), we can write down the “fundamental equation of politics” as “institutions X 
preferences = outcomes.” Integrity then appears to be a condition of “X” and efficiency a condition of “=”. 
34 Nor for that matter the “European social model” (see Laurent 2005).   
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The preferences aggregation process described in the previous paragraph therefore regards States 
and supposes that national political systems function so as to produce governments that are 
representative, on European policies as well as national ones, of national citizens’ preferences. In 
other words, we adopt the view according to which the EU as it is aims at indirectly uniting 
peoples through States, or, daring to contradict Monnet, to “form coalitions of states” in order to 
“unite people.”
35 For that matter, this unambiguous feature of the EU’s political system, was 
acknowledged in the otherwise innovative ECT. As in the EUT, Europeans citizens did not exist 
as such but only through their national State (Article I-10). It is under this qualification that the 
EU should respect integrity and efficiency.  We illustrate our position in Chart VI. 
 
[Chart VI here] 
 
Chart VI describes the implementation of the economic and social policies in the EU as a three-
step game. First citizens elect governments, then governments choose the European economic 
constitution, and finally economic policies are implemented according to this constitution (the 
distinction between those last two steps being characteristic of the constitutional political 
economy approach).  
 
In such a system, “integrity” can be defined as the principle according to which the economic 
constitutional provisions must not constrain the capacity of national welfare states to differ (see 
Section 5). Integrity essentially means protection of national diversity or in Scharpf’s (2002) 
words, “legitimate diversity.”
36 It supposes two distinct elements. First, that the economic 
constitutional provisions are neutral in the sense that they are sufficiently general not to 
systematically influence or constrain national models beyond a certain pre-agreed point; second, 
that these provisions can be revised to be adapted to the changing preferences expressed by 
national citizens when they elect their representatives at the European “table.” A change in the 
majority of member states, provided they are able to converge after negotiation on the enactment 
of a new economic constitution,
37 should result in a change of the economic constitutional 
provisions. Integrity is in our view the essential clause of the Lockian or Hobbesian contract EU 
member states have formed in the state of nature of international relations, now dominated by 
globalization.  
 
                                                           
35 Speech given in Washington (30 April 1952). 
36 As implicitly asserted in the motto of the EU: “United in diversity.” 
37 This process can be eased by efficient constitutional provisions, cf. infra.  
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“Efficiency” seems more straightforward, but still requires some substantial 
adaptation/interpretation. In the original Buchanan & Tullock (1962) framework, it is the 
principle that enables individuals to act collectively even if their preferences differ for the mutual 
benefit of the parties which, otherwise, could resort to non-co-operative and harmful behaviors 
(see Section 6). Here, where member states act as individuals’ agents, we add a substantial 
definition of efficiency to the formal one. The formal definition of efficient constitutional 
economic rules would be that, regardless of any judgment on the quality of the policies 
implemented, the provisions would be said efficient when collective decisions among member 
states that have a voice in the constitutional process are simply made possible.  
 
Our interpretation is that constitutional economic rules should also be efficient in a substantial 
way. Skach (2005) for instance calls the “potential policy improvement and social co-ordination” 
that could result from a good constitutional text, “the most compelling reasons for a formal, 
written constitution for the EU.” But even on this substantial basis, efficiency in the EU can still 
be assessed in many different ways. Upward convergence of economic welfare (namely high 
economic growth and low unemployment) is for the sake of simplicity the one we favor.
38 
 
By distinguishing integrity and efficiency as we have done, we nevertheless do not endorse in any 
way the “model of separation” between economic and social matters that was at the heart of the 
Treaty of Rome (see Laurent and Fitoussi, 2005).  Nor do we subscribe to the “social protection 
as a productive factor” approach developed by EU institutions since 1997 in the context of the 
“New social Europe” (see Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2003b). Integrity and efficiency in the EU are 
strictly related in two ways. Diverse national models are financially sustainable only if efficient 
constitutional provisions ensure that member states collectively produce enough economic 
growth and employment. With less than 2 percent of GDP growth per year,
39 no social model is 
sustainable in the long-run. In turn, healthy social models are instrumental to the beneficial use of 
countries’ “comparative advantages” (Hall & Soskice) and to sustainable economic growth itself 
(see Lindert, 2003 and Laurent, 2005a).  
 
Going back to the framework described in Chart VI, it can be said to be integrated in the sense 
that citizens are at the beginning and at the end of the process. More importantly, it is integrated 
contrary to three alternative fragmented approaches. 
 
                                                           
38 See Section 6.  
39 Idem.   
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The first one is the “naming, blaming, shaming” approach. It concentrates on the final step of 
this process and infers institutional and/or personal responsibility from the economic policies 
implemented in the EU (putting the blame on the ECB, its governor, such government, its 
officials,…). This understanding of the functioning of the EU, that often finds its way into the 
official literature since the “Lisbon Agenda” drafting in 2000,
40 overlooks an important maxim of 
the constitutional political economy, namely that “good games depend on good rules more than 
they depend on good players” (Brennan & Buchanan, 1988). If policies implemented in the EU 
are systematically wrong (or unfair), the blame is probably better put on rules rather than on 
players. Our belief is that, since the European economic constitution does not respect the 
integrity and efficiency principles (see infra, Section 5 & 6), the “European game” is biased so 
that the policies level is not the relevant one for evaluation.  
 
The second alternative approach tends to skip the first step of Chart VI. It puts side by side two 
seemingly contradictory models, the one resulting from the “no-bridge theorem” (see supra) and 
the direct legitimacy model. The former tolerates that once governments are regularly elected in 
the EU, a “black box” is substituted for what we have called “integrity and efficiency” and 
“constitutional discipline” so that European outcomes are reputed just and efficient even if the 
criteria to evaluate those qualities are lacking. The latter is concerned with the ways and means of 
establishing an organic direct link between citizens and the EU often to the expense, implicitly or 
explicitly, of the existing link between citizens and their national governments.
41  
 
The dynamics between the present state of the EU and the building of a European state or 
government remains unclear to us. More importantly, we note this approach, like the “no-bridge” 
model, overlooks the articulation of national democracies to the EU. We find it difficult to think 
of nation-states as mere nuisances in the European project. They are, possibly for another very 
long time, the natural locus of political legitimacy in Europe. As such, they are impossible to 
evacuate and necessary to integrate.  
 
Finally, the broad political trade-off in the EU has been repeatedly described in recent years as 
one between “input legitimacy” and “output legitimacy” (Scharpf, 1990), i.e. between individual 
voice and common welfare (see Chart VI). The sacrifice of democratic accountability would be 
                                                           
40 For a good example, see Facing the Challenge-The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment (Report from the 
High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok), November 2004. See Creel, Laurent & Le Cacheux (2005) for a 
critical assessment. 
41 For a recent convincing attempt, see Collignon, 2003.  
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justified by the efficient provision of public goods. Siedentop (2002) also describes such a trade-
off between legitimacy and efficiency. We think that this argument needs to be re-framed.  
 
Our concern is not with the legitimacy of an existing or hypothetical European central power but 
with the integrity of the member states diverse regimes that gave birth to and are part of it. 
Furthermore, we attempt to show in the remainder of this paper that the trade-off between 
“integrity” and “efficiency” as we have defined them is sub-optimal in the current state of the 
European economic constitution. While integrity is truly sacrificed, it is for a dubious efficiency. 
We now turn to the demonstration of this point, starting with the historical, geographical and 
analytical characterization of the European economic constitution.  
 
 
4. The European economic constitution, a definition  
 
 
The two ages of economic constitutionalism in Europe 
 
Legally, the EU has no constitution. It exists through a complex collection of Treaties. In 
assuming the existence of a constitutional order regulating economic matters we follow Weiler 
(2003). He defines very aptly the EU’s fundamental Sonderweg as the existence of a “constitutional 
discipline.”  
 
As is well known, economic integration was by no means a by-product of political integration in 
Europe. Actually, the opposite was intended to be true. The European economic constitution 
embedded in the Treaty of Rome was the original constitution of the European community, the 
“new legal order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights” according 
to the famous words of the ECJ.
42 In this respect, “economic integration” was for the “organized 
and living Europe”
43 the same matrix for integration than “commerce” was for the USA.
44 It is 
no surprise then that it accounts now for the most integrated, quasi-federal part, of the current 
regime of the EU (the so-called “first pillar”). 
 
                                                           
42 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos. 
43 Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950. 
44 See Amar (2005).   
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“Economic constitutional law consists of the constitutional rules that deal with economic 
matters,” this tautological definition given by J. Baquero Cruz,
45 while true, is not of great help 
for our inquiry. Two more precise definitions can be given to begin with in order to capture the 
reality of the European economic constitution: an historical one, and a related theoretical one. 
 
The first European economic constitution, drafted in 1957 and almost un-amended until 1992 in 
its fundamentals is articulated around Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome which defines the general 
rule of free circulation of goods in what was later to become the internal market. It was identified 
by Maduro (1998) as the economic constitutional core of the European Community. This first 
European economic constitution can be said to be hierarchically ordered, according to a 
Kelsenian logic, defining three successive objectives: free trade, control of States aids and free 
competition (see Chart VII). Fully implemented in 1993, when the Single market became a reality 
after the 1986 Delorian relance, this first European economic constitution did not entail explicit 
constraints on macroeconomic policies.  
 
[Chart VII here] 
 
But European economic constitutionalism did not stop with the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and workers, as it is sometimes thought. Nor does its subsequent evolution 
naturally derive from it. Even if the Treaty of Rome explicitly paved the way for monetary union, 
1992/1993 is in our view the true European constitutional rupture.  
 
However, the second age of economic constitutionalism in Europe was already in genesis in the 
1980s with the adoption of competitive disinflation policies as analyzed by Atkinson et al. (1993) 
and Fitoussi (1995). Those policies were to prove determinant in the framing of the convergence 
criteria defined by the Maastricht Treaty later constitutionalized by the Stability and Growth 
Pact.
46 Therefore, in the current constitutional pyramid of norms in the EU, once the completed 
objective of free competition became the basis, the fiscal discipline became the intermediary 
objective serving the “price” (or monetary) “stability” defined in Article 105 (see Chart VII).  
 
                                                           
45 In Between competition and free movement: the economic constitutional law of the European Community (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), quoted in Joerges (2004) 
46 The birth and development of this macroeconomic constitutional order is described in detail in Fitoussi 
(2002).  
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It is to be noted that this European economic constitution, which is arguably the most important 
achievement of European integration and is embedded in the European Union Treaty,
47 was not 
amended at all by the ECT.
48 This suggests that either the compromise it stands for is stable, i.e. 
beneficial for all parties (a Pareto equilibrium among member states) or that the economic 
performance it allows is satisfying (both points refuted in Section 6). It could also imply that it 
simply cannot be revised, which would be a motive to reform it (see Section 5). 
 
In any event, those two ages of European economic constitutionalism were heavily influenced by 
their intellectual context, respectively the first and second school of ordo-liberalism.  
 
From economic constitution to “anti-economic constitution” 
 
There is indeed a symmetry between the evolution of the European economic constitution and 
the intellectual dynamics of the ordo-liberalism school (originally school of Freiburg). As argued 
in Jorges (2004), the work of Weimar era thinkers like Walter Eucken, Alexander Rüstow and 
Franz Böhm was as post-socialist as it was post-laissez-faire. The State was in charge of the 
liberal order of the economy. Their original theory of the “economic constitution” meant that the 
legal order binds together the State and the market in a “social market economy.” As is well 
known, those ideas were central in the framing of the Treaty of Rome as they were in its 
acceptance by German elites. An important argument to mention here regarding the relation 
between integrity and efficiency is that the first European economic constitution was thought as 
an un-political order because it left untouched the social national regimes. Their partial principles 
of redistribution balanced its own neutral imperative of free competition.
49  
 
Jorgens (2004) identifies in the Single European Act the shift from the concern with (private) 
market failures to the concern with (public) State failures as the sign that the European economic 
constitution was changing in nature. We think of this latter change as only a step in the 
realization of the program of the first European economic constitution.
50 The real change, 
influenced by the second school of ordo-liberalism,
51 is the framing of the Maastricht Treaty. 
With Maastricht, the concern is shifted from the necessary respect of the economic law by the 
                                                           
47 See footnote 20. 
48 The only (negligible) exception is the proposition to institutionalize the informal Eurogroup.  
49 Hence the idea of the regulating European state developed by Majone (1996). 
50 More generally, we perceive the Single Act as a change in tactics (i.e. the adoption of the mutual 
recognition principle) but not in strategy (the realization of the Treaty of Rome program).  
51 Whose best known exponent was Friedrich A. von Hayek.  
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State (or the economic version of Humboldt’s Rechtstaat) to the democratic dis-embedding of 
those very rules that become autonomous from the State and the polity, a theory in line with 
Hayek’s conception of constitutionalism.
52 
 
The current European economic constitution that resulted from this movement can be said to 
have a “Declaration of independence” in Article 4 of the EUT, establishing its political 
philosophy and fundamental economic principles:  
 
1. (…) the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include…the adoption of 
an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' 
economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, 
and  conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition. 
 
2. (…) these activities shall include the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the 
introduction of a single currency …and the definition and conduct of a single monetary 
policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to 
maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general 
economic policies in the Community, in accordance with the principle of an open market 
economy with free competition. 
 
3. These activities of the Member States and the Community shall entail compliance with 
the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances and monetary 
conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. 
 
One of the problems of this “Declaration,” as will be argued in the next Section, is that it is more 
political than philosophical. To a certain extent, it pre-determines the content of member states 
public policies as opposed to their general or formal orientation. When the issue of integrity will 
be examined, we will argue that this is a limit to the European economic constitution’s principles 
of neutrality regarding national models.  
 
The four pillars  
 
As for its practical organization, the European economic constitution is currently constituted by 
four pillars,
53 hierarchically ranked (see Chart VII). The first is the ECB,
54 which de facto manages 
                                                           
52 See, inter al., “Constitutionalism in Europe” in The Constitution of liberty (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1960).  
53 Other economic provisions are to be found in the EU “soft” law (such as the “broad economic policy 
guidelines”). But none of them attain constitutional status.  
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the Euro so as to achieve the primary objective of price stability. The second is the Stability and 
growth pact, which is a tool for achieving the primary objective by insuring that fiscal imbalance 
does not threaten monetary stability. The third is the Single market, which is the common law of 
all EU member states laid down by the original constitution (cf. supra). The fourth is the EU 
budget, of negligible macroeconomic size but symbolically and structurally important
55 (Table I).  
 
[Table I here] 
 
Contrary to what is often assumed, especially in the most recent period where the Stability and 
growth pact was often presented as a very soft constraint, the EU economic constitution is, by 
and large, well respected. It is especially true of its highest principle. The problem therefore is not 
so much the compliance of member states with those principles but rather how those principles 
perform when the criteria of integrity and efficiency are applied to them. It can hardly be argued 
in our view that economic performance of the EU or the euro area are unsatisfying because the 
European economic constitution is simply not applied as it should be (see Section 6).  
 
To follow through with the example of the SGP, the announcement of its death by repeated 
violation seems premature. As noted by the ECJ in the 13 July 2004 Case C-27/04 - Commission 
of the European Communities v. Council, the constitutional provisions of the Pact were actually 
respected in November 2003. The majority required by Article 104 to implement the financial 
penalty provided for by the “excessive deficit procedure” has just not been reached. The decision 
to “hold in abeyance” the procedure can seem discretionary. But the Pact explicitly foresees the 
case in which the Commission and the Council can be in conflict and gives, under certain 
conditions, the advantage to the Council under the form of “discretion” of interpretation. 
Ultimately, the ECJ was to arbitrate between the two respecting the letter and spirit of the 
European economic constitution, and it found in favor of the Council. Moreover, all member 
states including France or Germany have continuously since 2003 implemented important fiscal 
and/or social reforms in order to comply with the SGP. This is not a clear signal that it has 
ceased to exist.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
54 This institutional prevalence was clearly marked by the 1st December 2005 decision of the ECB to 
increase policy rates to 2.25% against the publicly expressed will of almost all member states and the 
Eurogroup Presidency.  
55 See next section.  
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As regards the operational structure of the European economic constitution, it is finally worth 
mentioning that it does not only apply to the euro area, even if this is where it applies the most. It 
is actually built in concentric circles, allowing us to focus on the euro area as the most 
accomplished area of integration under the European constitutional provisions in the following 
theoretical and empirical parts of this paper.  
 
 
“Hard” and “soft” economic constitutionalism in the EU 
 
In the current age of the European economic constitution, the EMU process has defined three 
states of integration: the monetary integration (euro area), an intermediary state of integration or 
transit area, and a “soft” economic constitutionalism (Chart VIII).  
 
[Chart VIII here] 
 
Countries belonging to the euro area can be said to be submitted to the “hard” economic 
constitution, the one where monetary policy and exchange rate is federal in nature. But this is not 
to say that the rest of the 25 EU member states belong to a completely different economic order. 
They are subject to a soft European economic constitution which lays down their common law in 
the form of a less strict version of the SGP (that entails some monetary and exchange-rate 
dispositions) and the same Single market rules and EU budget that apply to the euro area 
members.   
 
The point of this representation is to show that there is a continuum between the “hard” and the 
“soft” European economic constitution and that the same logic defines the two. Thus, our 
assessment of the qualities of the European economic constitution as it applies to the euro area 
(Section 5 & 6) is really an assessment of the whole process of economic and monetary 
integration in the EU. We focus on the euro area because it is the essence of the European 
economic constitution. One last point before turning to the examination of the principle of 
integrity concerns the ideological content of the European economic constitution. 
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The limits of the ideological interpretation of the European economic constitution 
 
One other way of criticizing the constitutional economic regime of the European Union would 
be to stress how much the rules chosen owe to the economic doctrine dominant at the time they 
were designed, i.e. the new classical macro-economy sometimes referred to in a pedestrian way as 
“neo-liberalism.” Following Beard (1913), an “ideological interpretation of the Constitution” of 
the EU is thus possible, where ideological beliefs would replace class origin or economic 
interests. This perspective, in our view, is necessary but insufficient. 
 
Such an interpretation, in which we partially engage in the next section, is part of the empirical 
validation effort of Keynes’ intuition of the power of economic ideas. It certainly reveals 
convincing clues that a naïve monetarism, now considered outdated even by those who 
promoted it then, played a central role in the framing of the EMU rules. But as we try to show in 
this section, even from the ideological perspective, merely equating the European economic 
constitution to an institutionalized neo-liberalism appears far too simplistic.  
 
Moreover, such a critique, when made outside of the constitutional political economy approach, 
misses an important point. It is primarily the lack of political legitimacy of non-elected 
institutions of the EU that drives their adherence to economic doctrine, and only secondarily 
ideological inclination. How orthodoxy has become, in economic matters, EU’s legitimacy is an 
important question.  Why this is not a good thing for the EU is our focus. In other words, our 
principal concern is not with the causes of the economic constitutional state of the EU but with 
the consequences that result form it.
56 It actually appears hard to identify the economic doctrine 
behind the European economic constitution as a pure ideology. If anything, the EU resembles a 
“theorycracy” rather than a conspiracy. As the rationale for European collective action, the 
economic doctrine embedded in its constitution is supposed to serve a purpose: to efficiently 
unite member states while preserving their differences. We now wonder whether such a goal has 
been achieved.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
56 For an analysis of some of the causes, see Fitoussi (2002a) and Le Cacheux (2003).   
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5. The constitutional political economy of the EU: The costly sacrifice of 
integrity  
 
 
Political integrity, in its original version, can be simply defined as the preservation of individuals’ 
preferences in the course of collective action. Those can be altered because of the existence of 
the “social interdependence costs” identified by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). They are the 
expected costs induced by the necessary interactions between rational individuals willing to 
minimize transaction costs by acting together. The elementary dynamics of those costs is easy to 
imagine: the greater the number of individuals whose agreements are needed to take action in the 
political process, the lesser the value of expected integrity cost faced by a given individual who 
can increasingly have the possibility to block collective action when s/he feels her preferences 
could be violated.  
 
Interpreted in the EU context, as argued in Section 3, the principle needs to be redefined and this 
redefinition implies a choice over its substance. We have chosen to measure integrity of member 
states (agents of citizens here)
57 as their ability to: i) be assured that what they consider to be the 
essential features of their national models is preserved in the process of European integration 
(the collective action undertaken), or what we could call the “right to neutrality;” ii) be guaranteed 
that it is possible to change constitutional provisions through negotiation when the economic or 
political context calls for such a change. The schematic representation of the principle is given in 
Chart IX (the two polar cases of constitutional dictatorship, where only one agent chooses the 
constitutional rule and the case of unanimity, where all choose, are shown). 
 
 
[Chart IX here] 
 
 
Constitutional economic rules as neutral rules 
 
A very simple way to make sure that integrity in the sense of neutrality is always insured by the 
constitutional rule would be to impose, constitutionally, unanimous decision on each issue. This 
kind of constitutional rule was indeed supported by Wicksell (1896) for budgetary matters, first 
                                                           
57 Without consideration to the problems attached to principal-agent situations.  
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because according to him such a decision-making process was possible (since public finances 
finance public goods, everybody should agree on voting them), and second because it was 
desirable (citizens finance public finances through universal taxes and should thus have a voice in 
the process of budgetary decisions).  
 
But as noted by Buchanan (1987) and Phelps (1985), the simple unanimity rule of the kind 
advocated by Wicksell, because it makes the pursuit of individuals consents much too costly, is 
not suited to attain constitutional optimality defined here as the best possible trade-off between 
integrity and efficiency, or, to put it differently, the co-existence of the possibility of social choice 
and the right to oppose it. As mentioned supra, “the logical foundations of constitutional 
democracy” built by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) has made it possible to formalize it better. 
Interpreted by us, it measures the distance between the ECT and a normative model.  
 
Contrary to everyday political choices, which belong in the short democratic run (and thus are 
submitted to the law of changing majorities), constitutional choices are inscribed in long run 
perspective. For a given EU member state to accept and live by an economic rule – a rule that 
sometimes can produce a negative outcome for it – it has to be as general or neutral as possible 
given the diversity of member states, and apply over a fairly long period of time, so that positive 
expected outcomes may balance possibly negative ones. It also has to be agreed on, in the first 
place, through a unanimous procedure (Buchanan, 1986).  
 
In this respect, it is of crucial importance not to confuse a decision-making rule and a decision, 
i.e. a specific outcome of a public policy. The Buchanan and Tullock model makes it possible to 
overcome the political deadlock of constant unanimity, which would entirely favor integrity and 
sacrifice efficiency, by advocating a unanimous procedure leading to the choice of decision-
making  rules, not policy choices. Under this qualification, the analysis rejoins Rawls’ model of 
formal democracy (Rawls, 1971), providing that the application period of the rule is long enough 
for member states to find themselves placed behind a “veil of uncertainty” (and not of mere 
“ignorance,” see infra) at the moment of the constitutional choice.  
 
The neutrality of this “original position” is the guarantee of their freedom in the course of an 
otherwise mutually beneficial political process. Each and every member of the political 
community (or their agents, that are in our case EU member state governments) chooses the 
rules of decision of the community considering the possibility of being, in terms of preferences,  
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on either side (favorable or adverse, in the majority or the minority) of different outcomes if the 
rule is implemented. Of course, the consideration determining this choice greatly depends on the 
domain of collective action considered (an argument that supports a differentiation of rules 
across the different domains of collective action, see last section). 
 
The most interesting point of Chart IX is thus to show that integrity cost can be reduced if the 
political process becomes almost neutral in terms of individuals preferences. The more neutral 
the rule, the less collective action is going to be costly for a member state and the less it will be 
tempted to veto it. Integrity costs can be lowered by choosing neutral rules. On the contrary, the 
more substantial (i.e. not general) the rules, the higher the risk that member states’ preferences 
will be violated. In other words, rules not choices are to be the object of constitutional decision. 
This analysis explains in our view the paradox of European constitutional rules which we see as 
simultaneously invasive and almost un-revisable (see infra).  
 
In the light of the “principle of integrity” understood as neutrality, a first imperative appears: a 
constitution can not contain decisions but rules of decision of collective action. It can, if 
necessary, differentiate the rules from one domain of public action to another but it can not 
prescribe invariant choices for the minorities of the present and the majorities of the future in the 
form of the contents of public policies decided by past majorities. The application of this 
principle in the EU constitutional regime concerns the necessary neutrality of quasi-federal 
economic provisions concerning diverse national social models.  
 
Here a distinction must be made between the first and the second European economic 
constitution. Contrary to what has sometimes been argued (see Hix, 2005), the Single market 
provisions alone, as they have been partially applied by member states for the last five decades, 
are almost neutral to national models, that is as neutral as international trade can be.  
 
But, first of all, a completely different situation would be that of a freely circulating services
58 and 
workers area. Most importantly, in a context in which instruments of adjustments to economic 
shocks have been centralized, the mobility of capital is strong, the mobility of qualified labor 
equally strong and the mobility of unskilled labor weak (which is the current situation in the euro 
area), tax and social competition pose a serious threat to the integrity of national social models. 
Le Cacheux (2000), Le Cacheux and Saint-Etienne (2005) and Laurent (2005b) show how tax and 
                                                           
58 As called for by the “Services directive”, limited implementation of which is under negotiation between 
the European Parliament and the European Commission.   
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social competition has developed in the EU during the 1990s, where the European economic 
constitution was gradually implemented. In such a context of constraint and mobility, 
redistributive policies are submitted to the “shadow constitution” of tax and social competition 
(or constraint by mobility) and integrity through the neutrality of the Single market constitutional 
provisions is no longer assured.
59  
 
The second European economic constitution, while depriving member states of the means of 
autonomously responding to economic shocks and constraining macroeconomic policy by the 
sole monetary stability objective, is also un-neutral, but in a different way.  
 
Actually, the provisions defining monetary policy, fiscal policy and competition policy in the 
European economic constitution (as defined in Table I) violate the principle of neutrality because 
they institutionalize, or embed, an economic doctrine. An important theoretical point must be 
clarified here. The European economic constitution, as mentioned above, has been strongly 
influenced by the new classical macroeconomics literature. This literature relies on the “rules 
rather than discretion” model developed by Kydland and Prescott (1977) that seems to favor the 
application of seemingly neutral rules over the erratic exercise of economic policy by possibly 
irresponsible governments.  
 
Our view is that, beyond appearances, there is a strong contradiction between the requirements 
of “constitutional political economy” and the “economic constitutionalism”
60 formalized by 
Kydland and Prescott. In economic theory terms, inscribing the new classical macroeconomic 
framework in a constitution (an absolutely independent central bank like the ECB, sovereign over 
monetary and exchange rate policies, and a relatively independent administrative authority like the 
European Commission in charge of implementing the Stability and Growth Pact and the 
competition policy attached to the Single market) means choosing for present and future citizens 
the position along the Phillips curve (i.e. the trade-off between inflation and unemployment). In 
brief, there is a considerable difference between the specific rules that are designed to produce 
constantly similar outcomes and the general rules designed to allow for all possible outcomes to 
occur.
61 The first ones limit individuals’ freedom. The second ones authorize it.  
                                                           
59 See Laurent (2006). 
60 See Brennan & Hamlin, 1998. 
61 Although this distinction, sharply established in Buchanan and Tullock (1962), is somewhat blurred in 
Brennan and Buchanan (1986) which explicitly support the kind of rules advocated by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). Here a critical distinction must be made between the original constitutional political 
economy approach (developed in the context of the influence of Keynesianism over public policies  
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Our final argument about the current regime of the EU is that constitutional economic rules’ 
neutrality depends on member states’ heterogeneity. As we argue in the next section, it is 
important to consider that large and small member states coexist in the EU. 
 
The necessary revision of contingent rules 
 
To link this section to the previous, a reference can be made to the work of Elster, and in 
particular to the evolution of his understanding of constitutions as a collective pre-commitment 
devices. As is well known, the first Elster (1979) strongly advocates the existence of institutional 
instruments designed to constrain the collective will, extrapolated from the necessity of binding 
individuals’ potentially “self-defeating” rationality. But the second Elster (2000) acknowledges 
that going from private constitution to public constitution is problematic. Preventing oneself 
from doing something is acceptable because it is the “individual later” that is self-constrained by 
“the individual now.” A public constitution is of completely different order: “individuals now” 
bind “other individuals now” and their “descendants later.” Since, as Elster (2000) puts it, “No 
group has an inherent claim to represent the general interest. Society has neither an ego nor an 
id,” a constitution must contain general rules and must allow for their revision.  
 
In light of this second condition of integrity, the ability to revise rules, an element of complexity 
has to be added to the Buchanan and Tullock framework. Constitutional rules do not only 
concern the different ages of the present generation. They also rule the dynamic destiny of future 
generations. The Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” supposes that all members of the community are 
perfectly rational calculators that are able to sort out all social occurrences (i.e. social fates) the 
future holds but do not know what will be the realized one and choose criteria of social justice 
accordingly. What is lacking in both the Buchanan & Tullock and Rawls models is the perception 
of the true uncertainty defined by Knight (1921). In our view, what the economic constitutional 
rules have to deal with is not only complexity, but un-determination. The constitutional rules thus 
apply to a radically uncertain future that no calculation can describe, save decipher.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
making in the 1950s and 1960s) and the more ideologically-biased Public choice corpus developed 
afterwards. The latter views economic constitutionalism (as well as tax competition and more generally 
economic competitive federalism) as a way to constrain Leviathans’ discretionary powers over citizens and 
institute an efficient liberal economic order. The belief expressed in this sub-section is that this second 
approach is in many ways orthogonal to the original one when it justifies pre-determined policies on 
behalf of efficiency. Order is then preferred over justice, contrary to the original concern of preventing 
majorities abuses on minorities.  
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This uncertainty, and the cautiousness it implies for constitution-drafters, becomes critical when 
constitutions rule economic matters, submitted to erratic fluctuations of partly mysterious 
business cycles.
 62 As King (2004) puts it, “the core of the monetary policy problem is uncertainty 
about future social decisions resulting from the impossibility and undesirability of committing 
our successors to any given monetary policy strategy.” In other words, it is undesirable and 
impossible to try “to foresee all the incidents in the life of a nation” (Tocqueville) in an economic 
constitutional text. The question of the possibility of revising economic constitutional rules once 
they have been adopted appears of decisive importance in this regard. Kydland and Prescott 
(1977), pointing the risk of “time inconsistency” of public policy, insist on the fact that there 
should be “institutional arrangements which make it a difficult and time-consuming process to 
change the policy rules in all but emergency situations.” But what if the rules chosen appear to be 
ill-suited or simply inferior to another rule or set of rules, or become not wanted anymore by 
participants? This is where economic constitution should entail flexible revision provisions. Such 
provisions do not exist for the four pillars of the European economic constitution.  
 
Actually, if none of the four pillars of the European economic constitution are democratically 
revisable, for instance by a simple super-majority rule, each has a degree of inertia that differs 
from the other. It is to be noted that the revision of economic constitutional rules could take two 
different forms: a qualitative one (member states could decide that there would not be any limit 
to public deficit anymore) or a quantitative one (the limit is now set at 4 percent instead of 3 
percent of GDP). As a general principle, even if economic policies are supposed to belong to the 
“first pillar” of the EU and thus subject to the qualified majority procedure, all formal and 
substantial revisions of any provisions of the European economic constitution implying a change 
in the Treaty are de facto submitted to the unanimity of the 25 member states, while those 
regarding monetary and exchange-rate policy are in addition subject to the agreement of the 
ECB. 
 
More specifically, the provisions regarding monetary and exchange rate policy
63 are the most 
intangible constitutional economic provisions in the EU, as they obey what could be called a 
“qualified unanimity” rule. Not only are they not democratically revisable, but they can not be 
                                                           
62 The unforeseen evolution of the US economy during the second part of the 1990s is a recent 
spectacular example.
  
63 Although exchange rate policy should legally be a shared competence and thus submitted to a different 
procedure (see Table I).   
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revised even by unanimous member states without the consent of the European central bank. 
That is why it is the ECB itself that revises its objectives when it feels it is needed (as in 1998 and 
2003, see Table I), without any accountability procedure afterwards.  
 
Competition policy and Single market provisions, as we have defined them (Table I), are only 
revisable by “simple” unanimity.  
 
The provisions regarding national fiscal policy, the Stability and growth pact, have apparently 
been revised by the European Council of the 22 and 23 March 2005, which is sometimes thought 
of as showing that the European economic constitution entails some flexibility. Nevertheless, 
while many have consequently hailed the agreement detailed in the Brussels Presidency Council 
Conclusions, some even lamenting that it had denatured the SGP, a careful reading of the text 
reveals otherwise and points in the opposite direction. What appears is that fiscal rules contained 
in the European economic constitution can be revised in a very special way: they can be hardened 
(or expanded) but not softened (or restricted).  
 
 While the Council’s Conclusions optimistically state that: “The amendments to the Stability and 
Growth Pact will...enable Member States to play a full role in re-launching long-term growth,” 
one should refer to the detailed content of the Brussels agreement, which is very close to the line 
defended in the European Commission’s Communication of 3 September 2004 “Strengthening 
economic governance and clarifying the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact.” The 
agreement relies on four major points, the balance of which leans more toward a renewed rigidity 
than added flexibility: 
 
- “A strengthening of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact” through the 
development of “medium-term objectives, between -1% of GDP for low debt/high 
potential growth countries and balance or surplus for high debt/low potential growth 
countries.” 
 
- “A more symmetrical approach to fiscal policy,” Member States being invited to 
“commit at a European level to actively consolidate public finances in good times” and to 
“pursue an annual adjustment in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-offs and other 
temporary measures, of 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark.” 
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- An attention “in order to enhance the growth oriented nature of the Pact”, for 
“structural reforms ... when defining the adjustment path to the medium-term objective 
for countries that have not yet reached this objective and in allowing a temporary 
deviation from this objective for countries that have already reached it.” 
 
- A tolerance, “for other relevant factors in the steps leading to the decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit, fully conditional on the overarching principle that the 
excess over the reference value is temporary and the deficit remains close to the reference 
value” and provided that “no redefinition of the Maastricht reference value for the deficit 
via the exclusion of particular budgetary items should be pursued.” 
 
This last point in particular is crucial in ruling out the possibility of regulating public finances in 
the EU by introducing a “golden rule” discriminating between government consumption and 
public investment. The “new flexibility” of the SGP seems to aim at temporarily relieving the 
burden on the euro area member states that don’t abide by the Pact in the context of the 
European “soft growth” since 2001 (they formed a majority in 2005) at the cost of higher rigidity 
in the future, especially during economic booms, and hardened surveillance of the financial 
sustainability of social systems. In allowing for flexibility in the short-term but rigidity in the long 
run, this version of the SGP is even worse than the former with respect to integrity. 
 
Finally, the EU budget, the most democratic of all constitutional economic provisions in theory, 
given the role the European Parliament plays in its decision, violates the principle of integrity in 
its very own way. It does so through the democratic inconsistency of the “financial framework” 
adopted in 1987 and enacted in 1988. Le Cacheux (2005a) makes the case against this 
inconsistency. In the mind of its promoters, Jacques Delors in particular, the adoption of a pluri-
annual programming framework covering a long time (7 years) was designed to insure a certain 
stability to spending projects and a better transparency for financing bodies at the national and 
regional level generally involved in long-term schemes. This framework was also destined to 
allow the European Commission itself to launch important European projects, such as transport 
or research networks. The belief in the virtue of pre-commitment was strong. 
 
The democratic failure of this framework lies in its inertia and the de-synchronization it implies: 
the financing timing being anterior to the democratic one, it ends up being predominant. For 
instance, the Barroso Commission budget submitted to the European Council in June 2005 (and   
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only agreed upon at the 15-16 December 2005 European Council in Brussels after a first 
disagreement in June) had actually been elaborated eighteen months earlier by the Prodi 
Commission, in contradiction with the principle according to which the budget presented by the 
Commission should also reflect the priorities of the newly elected Parliament (even if the 
Parliament enters the negotiations after the Council agreement).  
 
According to the European economic constitution, with the budget adopted by the Council in 
December 2005, the financial perspectives would not come into force before 2007. But the 
composition of the Commission could evolve in the mean time and will apply until 2013, 
although the mandate of the Parliament will end in 2009. The new Parliament will then re-
conduct the pre-committed budget for another four years, while preparing the next financial 
perspectives binding the following majority. The votes cast by EU citizens in 2004 for the 
European elections will therefore only, in any case, influence marginally European policies by 
2007, but more probably constrain the decisions that the representatives they will elect in 2009 
will take. In the face of such a democratic de-synchronization, the derailed budgetary negotiations 
in June 2005 actually appear as an opportunity, not seized, to re-synchronize finances and 
democracy in the EU. But it is our conviction that the exercise of democracy should not be 
accidental in the EU.  
 
A critical example of this unsatisfying budgetary situation
64 is the much celebrated “Lisbon 
strategy,” decided in March 2000. The financial framework under which heads of State and 
government launched the decennial strategy (2000-2010) had in reality been decided in 1998, 
adopted in 1999 in Berlin, and set to end in 2006. The discrepancy between the ambitions 
defined in Lisbon and the mid-term results attained in 2005 can be read, in the context of the 
general perspective presented here, as a problem of coordination between goals and 
instruments.
65 
 
Our conclusion is that, because the European economic constitution mixes rules or instruments 
with choices or predefined contents, it perverts the significance of the original unanimous 
constitutional choice
66 while not allowing for its revision. The argument according to which the 
                                                           
64 That is all the more regrettable if one recalls that parliamentary democracies, or rather republics, where 
born in the 17th and 18th century out of the appropriation by parliamentary assemblies of the budgetary 
power.  
65 See Creel, Laurent and Le Cacheux (2005).  
66 Agreeing unanimously on predetermined choices annihilates the principle of integrity that unanimity is 
supposed to secure.  
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federal or pseudo-federal nature of the EU implies that one should know “who does what” does 
not appease this critique at all. “Who does what?” is a very different question from “What is 
done?”  
 
Future economic evolutions are simply not foreseeable. This is why the longest-lasting economic 
constitutions are the shortest, i.e. those with the most general and less detailed provisions. If 
constitutions are detailed, then they at least should be revisable. To put it once again into King’s 
(2004) phrasing, the reason why we should revise rules of economic decision is quite simple: “it is 
that we are unwilling to commit now never to learn from future experience.”  Such a question 
borders on the matter of the efficiency of the European economic constitution and leads to our 
next Section: is the sacrifice of integrity worth the promised efficiency? 
 
6. The dubious efficiency: A “size nexus” in the EU? 
 
 
Searching for consent is costly. How is it possible to minimize the decision-making costs for 
policies that are deemed mutually beneficial, given that decision costs increase with the number 
of parties involved, both because of increased heterogeneity of preferences and because of 
bargaining and other transactions costs? This interrogation led to the original formulation by 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) of what we have called the “efficiency” principle. But, as in the 
case of integrity, a reformulation of the principle is necessary to shed some light on the EU 
constitutional political economy.  
 
We define efficiency in the EU as the ability of European economic rules to insure both an 
upward coordination of European economies (high economic growth and full employment) and 
to avoid the choice of harmful non-cooperative strategies (such as “race to the bottom” tax and 
social competition). In doing so, we still acknowledge that efficiency cost increase with the 
number of participants that are involved in the process but we add that: i) those costs can be very 
low if constitutional economic rules are efficient enough (the benefit of upward coordination 
balancing the cost of the quest for good rules); ii) they have to take into account heterogeneity 
and especially size heterogeneity of participants in collective action. The simple dynamic of 
“efficiency” is illustrated in Chart X.  
 
[Chart X here] 
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One should note that this adapted representation allows both for the formal definition of 
efficiency, leading to paralysis when all member states have a voice in the constitutional choice, 
and for the substantial definition, leading to divergence when the rules chosen do not sufficiently 
take into account heterogeneity, not only in preferences, but in characteristics of member states. 
 
What emerges from the abundant economic literature on policy co-ordination is the generic idea 
that the need for co-ordination arises in contexts characterized by interdependencies: in such 
contexts, decentralized decision-making in the absence of co-ordination devices will lead to sub-
optimal, non cooperative, Nash equilibria. In a monetary union with decentralized fiscal 
authorities, economic interdependencies may arise from different channels. They generally result 
from spillovers, i.e. unintended consequences of national macroeconomic policies on other 
member states economies, and such spill-over effects may be positive or negative. 
 
While the economic rationales for policy coordination in a monetary union are quite numerous  – 
but of unequal and debatable empirical relevance – they leave open the issue of how to design 
institutions at the constitutional level that would foster coordination, and also of the costs and 
benefits of the various tools that may be used to elicit favorable behavior from national 
governments of member states in a monetary union (see Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2004a). Fiscal 
policy rules, such as the SGP, constitute the minimum coordination devices: by setting limits on 
what national governments are allowed to do, they are meant to prevent them from embarking 
on behavior reputed harmful for the union as whole. But the provisions of the European 
economic constitution, by and large respected, appear insufficient to go further down the path of 
efficiency as we have defined it. Worse, they trigger opposite dynamics. 
  
If European integration is the “invisible hand” described in the Prologue of this paper, then the 
key issue it faces is the economic incentives given to the member States toward reaching mutually 
beneficial equilibrium. In this regard, claiming that the EU has the “right institutions” but the 
“wrong policies” and chastising EU or member States officials accordingly (the naming, blaming, 
shaming approach) has a weak analytical foundation: policies are the outcomes of incentives 
produced by institutions. If policies are systematically wrong, institutions must be flawed.  
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The “European output” 
 
As was argued in Section 2, integrity costs could still be very high if efficiency costs are very low, 
i.e. if member states exchanged economic sovereignty for common welfare (the input-output 
trade-off defined by Scharpf, 1990). Even if one adopts this perspective, the problem in our view 
is that this promised trade-off has not been realized. European economic rules are not, or no 
longer, efficient in producing convergence and welfare in the EU. 
 
There are two ways of assessing the efficiency of the European economic constitution. The first 
one is to assess the global performance of the EU. Since the euro area is the most integrated part 
of the EU (see Section 4), and thus the one part where the sacrifice of integrity is the most costly, 
one can try to assert its performance, then compare it to the EU (where the sacrifice is less costly, 
see next sub-Section) and to the rest of the world (where no integration of such scope has taken 
place). As it is now well established, the growth performance of the euro area under the 
European economic constitution is nothing less than dismal compared to that of the US and 
Asia, its main economic counterparts (see Chart XI). 
 
[Chart XI here] 
 
Our estimation of the surprising gap, given the gradual implementation of the European 
economic constitution and economic and monetary integration that resulted from it, is the 
following: during the 1990-2004 period, the growth rate of the euro area was approximately half 
of that of the US and a quarter of that of Asia. The result of this sustained dismal growth is 
respectively a 16 percent and 49 percent gap in terms of output at the end of the period regarding 
its two counterparts in globalization. The concern over this “growth gap” that strikingly seems to 
widen as the economic integration progresses, is reinforced by the decreases in standard of living 
and productivity from 1996 to 2003 (our period of reference, see infra Box I). In the meantime, 
unemployment maintained itself between 9 percent and 11 percent, barely decreasing in the late 
1990s only to increase again in the early 2000s onward. Whatever the explanation, this 
performance has to be related to the considerable effort implied by European integration.   
 
The second way to assess the efficiency of the European economic constitution is to measure the 
degree of coordination between European economies that the application of European 
constitutional provisions has allowed. The overall performance might not be that good, but this  
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could be explained by numerous factors (among them the much-maligned “social models,” see 
following Sections), although, once again, the non-application of the European economic 
constitution could not be said to be one of them. A convergence among member states in 
nominal (the “Maastricht convergence” and EMU management) and structural terms (the 
“Lisbon strategy”) would be the sign of the partial success of the EMU rules and the promise of 
a better growth and development performance for the future. Alas, this picture is also 
surprisingly disappointing (see Chart XII).  
 
 
[Chart XII here] 
 
Our estimation leads to the conclusion that nominal and real divergence in the euro area is 
roughly the same in 2003 as it was in 1996. Standard deviation in inflation rates has decreased 
from 0.98 to 0.95 while standard deviation in productivity levels has decreased from 18.2 to 17.9, 
the same negligible 0.03 convergence.  
 
This general picture of the “European output” is of great importance for the relevance of the 
input-output trade-off. Two specific conclusions can also be drawn from it. The first one is that 
in spite of efforts during the transition phase to economic and monetary union, especially 
through the imposition of convergence criteria toward the Euro for almost a decade (1992-1999), 
the economies of the euro area have proven much more heterogeneous than what had been 
expected and, in a way, resistant to the convergence process chosen and implemented. This 
resistance has to be explained. Second, this resistance to convergence has very important 
consequences in terms of macroeconomic management, both with regard monetary and fiscal 
policies. While “social models” on the one hand, and monetary conditions and transmission 
mechanisms on the other have been pushed forward in the recent literature as candidates able to 
account for such differences, we offer another explanation, that we test, based on the 
heterogeneous size of European countries.   
 
Our main argument can be summed up as follows: one of the major reasons why European 
economic constitution provisions have become increasingly inefficient is that they do not take 
into account a structural heterogeneity among member states, namely their sizes. To put it simply, 
European constitutional provisions are “size-blind” while size matters and therefore are 
systematically biased which is the worse a constitutional provision can be. The consequence of  
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this bias is far-reaching: heterogeneity in size in a monetary union means heterogeneity in 
structures, performances and incentives, eventually resulting in conflicting strategies that can 
become inefficient for all parties.  
 
The “size nexus” 
 
The theory of collective action
67 has first identified a size issue in political economy dynamics. 
But our “size nexus” argument goes back to the very beginning of the modern understanding of 
the dynamic of international trade. It was John Stuart Mill, after the classical contributions of 
Adam Smith, his own father James Mill and David Ricardo, who first made the case for the role 
of size in trade and economic performance.  
As it is well known, the point of departure of Mill is the idea that if trade is mutually beneficial, it 
is not equally beneficial to participants. As Mill (1844) puts it in “Of the Laws of Interchange 
between Nations; and the Distribution of the Gains of Commerce among the Countries of the 
Commercial World:” “it is the purpose of the present essay to inquire, in what proportion the 
increase of produce, arising from the saving of labour, is divided between the two countries,” 
what he calls “the question of exchangeable value.”  In doing so, he goes on, “we must revert to a 
principle anterior to that of cost of production, and from which this last flows as a consequence,-
namely, the principle of demand and supply.”  In other words, while Ricardo’s comparative 
advantages, whatever their origin, determines pre-trade relative prices, Mill intend on explaining 
post-trade prices, that determine which country, or type of country, gain the most from trade, 
given that all countries’ gains are assumed to be positive when compared to autarchy.  
His theory, re-asserted in Mill (1848)
68 and later called “reciprocal demand,” is formulated by him 
as follows:  
 
It may be considered, therefore, as established, that when two countries trade together in 
two commodities, the exchangeable value of these commodities relatively to each other 
will adjust itself to the inclinations and circumstances of the consumers on both sides, in 
such manner that the quantities required by each country, of the article which it imports 
from its neighbour, shall be exactly sufficient to pay for one another. 
 
                                                           
67 See Olson (1965). 
68 “Of International values”, chapter XVIII, book III.  
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The subtle and profound conclusion of Mill, directly leading to the idea of a structural advantage 
of small countries over large one in international trade is further explained in those terms:   
 
If the question be now asked, which of the countries of the world gains most by foreign 
commerce, the following will be the answer. If by gain be meant advantage, in the most 
enlarged sense, that country will generally gain the most, which stands most in need of 
foreign commodities. But if by gain be meant saving of labour and capital in obtaining the 
commodities which the country desires to have, whatever they may be; the country will 
gain, not in proportion to its own need of foreign articles, but to the need which 
foreigners have of the articles which itself produces. 
 
Translated in modern economic parlance, this intuition means that the gain from international 
trade of a given country will be determined by the relative strength of the demand for its exports 
compared to its demand for imports. More precisely, the gain from trade between two nations 
will be distributed equally only if their terms of trade (the value of their exports in term of their 
imports) are equal. When the two nations are unequal in size (i.e. economic size, cf. infra), Mill 
thus showed that the small country could reap the benefit of trade since its needs in terms of 
internal demand could be satisfied by (labor saving) trade while its exports could be amply 
demanded to fulfill the consumption needs of the large country, unable to fully satisfy its internal 
demand.  
 
On the contrary, the large country would only benefit in a limited way (the limit being the 
capacity of production of the small country) of trade, responding to its unanswered internal 
needs by a forced “production of commodities by more costly processes at home” and thus 
losing the corresponding specializing gains. In sum, while trade between two nations of equal size 
can produce terms of trade halfway to the pre-trade prices of each nation, and thus equal gains 
resulting from post-trade prices, trade between a small and a large nation is likely to produce an 
unequal outcome in the favor of the small nation, the post-trade prices being too close from the 
large nation pre-trade prices. How to make sense of Mill’s argument in the euro area context 
without stretching it too far?  
 
We have shown (in Section 4) that the European economic constitution can broadly be 
characterized by four essential provisions (called “pillars” in Table I), themselves resulting in two 
main features: a well-institutionalized Single market allowing for a strong (free) trade integration 
and a strong constrain put on macroeconomic instruments, reducing the ability to implement  
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stabilization policies. In this context, it is our belief that economic performances will 
systematically differ between small and large countries, which may account for a substantial part 
of the inefficient divergence observed supra.  
 
To test our analysis and prove our point, we devise a very simple theoretical framework and 
empirical strategy. We first have to define what we mean by small and large European countries.  
The literature trying to stress the importance of size, in particular the one that focused on “small 
states,” while at least two decades old in its modern version (see Katzenstein, 1985), has recently 
gained momentum and is now in a state of fast-development in relation with European 
integration (see Archer and Nugent, 2002).   
 
A crucial point of this literature with which we find ourselves in complete agreement is to show 
that while there is no consensual definition of size, it is because this notion is essentially relative 
in international relations. Depending on the context in which small states find themselves, their 
“smallness” can translate into very different power position. It is obvious that given the “over-
representation” of small states in the EU, their power is considerably higher than equally small 
states not implied in such an a-typical regional organization.
69 
 
We make ours such a comparative definition of size: in the remainder of the paper, a “small” 
state, whatever the criterion used, is defined as one with a quantitative characteristic inferior to 
the fourth of that of the biggest or largest state. A “medium” state is defined as one with half (of 
the biggest state). “Large” states are those remaining. We then introduce two different definitions 
of size: demographic size (Table II) and economic size (Table III).  
 
 
[Tables II & III here] 
 
As shown in Tables II and III, in terms of demographic size, the EU as a whole can be said to be 
composed of 19 small states, 2 medium states and 4 large states. In economic terms, the count is 
almost identical, the EU being composed of 20 small states, 1 medium state and 4 large states 
(Poland logically being the “swing” state). Our definition is even more symmetrical for the euro 
area, which can be said to be composed, both in terms of population (demographic size) and 
GDP (economic size), of 8 small states (hereafter “the small 8”), 1 medium state (Spain) and 
                                                           
69 We come back to this important point in Section 7.   
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three large states (hereafter “the big 3”). Equipped with this definition of size, we now turn to 
our theoretical framework. Using Mill’s intuition, we build our model with the first block being 
demographic size (see Chart XIII). 
 
[Chart XIII here] 
 
The theoretical part of the Chart is straightforward. While demographic size (defined as the 
population level) logically determines economic size (defined as the GDP level), economic size 
determines whether a country will be open to trade (openness being measured by trade to GDP 
ratio), the traditional “small open economy” or, on the contrary dependent on its domestic 
market to grow (“the big closed economy”).  This theory is then applied to the euro area and the 
reference to Mill follows: we wonder in what direction economic size determines the growth 
performance. Growth performance in turn determines inflation and public finance performance. 
It also determines unemployment on the one hand, and the ability/gain from implementing 
structural policies (or, conversely, the need for macroeconomic stabilization policies). This 
sequence finally determines the policy implication of our model: the relevance (or irrelevance) of 
the size-blind European economic constitution. Eventually, if our empirical analysis confirms our 
theoretical intuition, a reform in the European economic constitution as well as in the growth 
strategy pursued in the EU (the “Lisbon agenda”) would be needed.
 70  
 
The very simple empirical strategy we have chosen to test this set of hypotheses is explained in 
detail in Box I, as well as our main results and their implications.  
 
[Box I here] 
 
 
The results are presented graphically and numerically in Chart XIV to XVI. 
 
 
[Charts XIV to XVI here] 
 
In a nutshell, our conclusion is that “size matters” for growth and macro-management in the 
euro area in a similar geographic way that “borders matter” for trade. Theories of trade, however 
                                                           
70 The signs and numbers shown on Chart XIII result form our empirical analysis (see Box I).  
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sophisticated, have to take into account the basic geographical determinant consisting of physical 
proximity. In the same way, macroeconomic management depends fundamentally on country 
size. Actually, in the EU case, size matters even more than borders matter; since the fact that 
European countries are geographically close explains a good deal of trade intensity which in turn 
determines size-related economic performance divergence. Focusing on monetary policy, we 
offer an empirical example of the consequences of the “size nexus” in Chart XVII, giving 
evidence of a “size penalty” in the euro area (the bigger the country, the lower the inflation rate, 
the higher the real interest rate).  
 
[Chart XVII here] 
 
In qualitative terms, we believe we have gathered evidence of the existence of a “Millian growth” 
(see Box I), systematically biased under the European economic constitution in favor of small 
states of the euro area.  In quantitative terms, we present evidence of a systematic divergence between 
small states and large states that amount to 2.3 percentage points in real growth, 0.73 percentage 
point in inflation and 3.12 percentage points in public finance balance (see Charts XIV to XVI).  
 
Our results, in addition to the evaluations presented in Box I (see next sub-section), are also to be 
confronted with the historical and geographical perspectives. This is done respectively in Table 
IV-A & IV-B and in Table VI. 
 
[Tables IV-A, IV-B here] 
 
Table IV-A shows that a certain convergence has taken place among EU 12 countries in terms of 
productivity. But the persisting differences can be attributed to the differences between small and 
large countries. It also confirms the idea that the gap in standard of living between the euro area 
and the US between 1975 and 1990 can not be attributed to a gap in productivity, but that this 
catch-up seems now over, the productivity gap beginning to increase again between 1990 and 
1998. Table IV-B rules out the hypothesis of growth performances explained by a Solow type 
convergence (less capital per capita leading to higher productivity and higher growth) between 
small and large countries in the euro area. The convergence is already achieved by 1990. What is 
spectacular on the contrary, and the symptom of the “Millian growth” under the European 
economic constitution (see Box I), is the inversion of GDP per capita difference between small 
and large countries in the future euro area between 1990 and 1998. The increasing gap in terms  
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of GDP per capita between 1990 and 1998 relative to the US accounts for the well-documented 
difference between the American “glorious decade” and the European dismal one.   
 
Table V, beside our basic argument that EU 12 member states diverge according to size, shows 
that our results are consistent, from a geographical perspective, on two different levels.  
 
 
[Table V here] 
 
During our period of reference, the small country under the economic provisions of the EU (as 
defined in Chart VIII) but not in the euro area (Sweden) does less well than small countries in the 
euro area (but better than large countries), while both are outperformed by countries outside the 
EU. The economic effects of the European economic constitution seems thus to follow a “U” 
curve for small countries, in relation to the degree of openness to trade that the Single market on 
the one hand and globalization on the other offer and to the macroeconomic stability provided 
by the monetary union.  Symmetrically, the large country outside the euro area but in the EU (the 
UK) does better than large euro area countries, while large countries outside the EU do better 
than both. This time, the degree of macroeconomic autonomy seems to be the driving factor 
behind those differences in performance.  
 
Our main finding is that small countries have substantially outperformed large ones in the euro 
area because they are more open to trade. The two groups thus exhibit systematic 
macroeconomic divergence in terms of inflation and public finances inconsistent with the present 
state of the European economic constitution as well as with the growth strategy entailed in the 
Lisbon agenda (Chart XIII). This result is in line with some of the recent literature relating 
economic performance to size.  
 
On the one hand, Alesina and Spolaore (2005) show that country size matters for economic 
prosperity insofar as it is correlated with the country’s degree of economic integration with the 
rest of the world. More precisely, the fact that small countries have prospered more than large 
ones in the EU seems related to the fact that the benefits of country size decrease as economic 
integration increases, or that benefits of trade openness and economic integration become larger 
for smaller countries. The fact that the European economic constitution gives small countries the  
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advantage of trade while not allowing large countries to compensate their handicap may therefore 
explain part of the divergence in their performances in the recent period.  
 
On the other hand, the theoretical idea according to which small size favors the implementation 
of structural reforms while large countries are in need of macroeconomic stabilization (argument 
elaborated in detail in Le Cacheux 2005) has recently received empirical validation. Duval and 
Elmeskov (2005), who perform regressions for 21 European countries in the period 1983-2003, 
find for instance that the incentive to implement structural reform is strengthened for small 
countries, because “the up-front costs of structural reform may rise more as a result of moving to 
EMU in large, relative closed economies than in smaller, more open economies.” “Simulations 
using OECD’s macroeconomic model, Interlink, supports these conjectures” they add, arguing 
that “In the more open (Dutch) economy, improved competitiveness leads to market share gains 
that fairly quickly translate into a fall in unemployment …In the more closed (French) economy 
the process is much slower.”  
 
Furthermore, they note that: “The results concerning the influence of monetary autonomy and 
country size can be rationalized within a framework where structural reform is expected to create 
slack resources in economies. In small open economies such slack is more quickly taken up 
through changes in net trade and incentives to undertake structural reform are therefore stronger. 
In larger, more closed economies, by contrast, net trade is less powerful as a mechanism for 
taking up slack. Hence, such economies are more reliant on accommodation through monetary 
policy when they undertake structural reform, and when exchange-rate arrangements exclude 
such accommodation they undertake less reform.” This line of reasoning is consistent with our 
finding that the monetary “size penalty” endured by large countries in the most recent period (see 
Chart XVII) is likely to slow even more their implementation of structural reforms.  
 
In the light of this section, the present design of the European economic constitution which does 
not discriminates countries on the criterion of size, appears to be systematically biased against 
large countries. It thus might be ill-suited to promote high levels of growth, employment and 
convergence among member states belonging to the EMU. Moreover, the present constitutional 
economic provisions are likely to increase the risk that non-cooperative strategies will be chosen 
in the EU. Before coming to this point, we first have to show that our “size nexus” argument 
holds despite the widely held belief that European economic shortcomings are first and foremost 
the result of a “social nexus.”   
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The size nexus vs. the “social nexus” 
 
Since the publication of the seminal work by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and the 1995 
OECD Job study, the debate over European economic performances has been dominated by the 
idea that labor market quality (itself determined by the “flexibility” allowed by low levels of 
taxation and redistribution, i.e. a small “socio-tax wedge”) fundamentally determines growth in 
Europe. While this partial equilibrium analysis is nothing new
71 and empirically doubtful (see 
Fitoussi and Passet, 2000, Fitoussi, 2002b, and Le Cacheux and Sterdyniak, 2003), the argument 
seems to exhibit an hysteresis of its own, at it is perpetually re-asserted as the starting point for 
diagnosing Europe’s growth problem.   
 
In Tables IV-A to VI-F and Charts XVIII and XIX, equipped with the framework of the “size 
nexus,” we offer new evidence that its foundations seem weak.   
 
[Tables VI-A to VI-F here] 
 
While the coefficients for the “size nexus” presented in Tables VI-B, VI-E & VI-F remain strong 
and significant against the “social nexus,” social transfers seem to contribute positively to growth. 
An analysis based on the relation between growth and social transfers and total expenditures 
must nevertheless consider the possibility of strong reverse causation, i.e. counter-cyclical 
behavior of those expenditures (due to “automatic stabilizers”), such that as growth increases, 
expenditures and transfers should fall. When social transfers enter significantly in the regression, 
however, the surprising result is that they are positively related to growth.  
 
Here a reference can be made to the literature relating openness to the size of the government. 
Rodrik (1998) has argued that small open economies compensate the risk of openness to trade by 
large social transfers. Our results, as limited as they are by the very simple methods we have 
chosen, confirm this view in showing that social transfers are positively related to openness. 
Furthermore, they indicate that while small open economies need a strong welfare state to 
compensate the hazards of openness, large closed economies need autonomous macroeconomic 
                                                           
71 The founding contribution of Jacques Rueff identifying unemployment insurance as the major cause of 
persistent unemployment was published in 1931.  
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policies to compensate their lack of openness and make the most of their domestic market in 
order to grow.  
 
In any event, unemployment and long-term unemployment, do not seem related to either of 
these variables, while they are strongly related to size. We find that the gap between small and 
large countries in terms of unemployment and long-term unemployment is respectively of 3.9 
and 2.2 percentage points. The “size nexus,” both for growth and unemployment, seems stronger 
than the “social nexus” in the EU 12. Chart XVIII & XIX graphically confirm this result.  
 
 
[Charts XVIII & XIX here] 
 
While Chart XIX shows that the relation between size and unemployment seems strong, Chart 
XVIII gives some evidence of the weakness of the “social nexus.” Two versions of the “social 
nexus” are confronted with reality with no success, the intra-model differences in unemployment 
being much more significant than inter-model differences, suggesting that another factor drives 
the divergence among EU 12 member states, namely size. 
 
A final way to measure the apparent irrelevance of the “social nexus” is to pair EU 15 countries 
two by two, one small and one large, in the same social model category (the “nordic model” has 
only one small representative). This is done in Chart XX which once more seems to confirm that 
size trumps social in the euro area. 
 
[Chart XX here] 
  
 
As already observed in Table V, the performances of the UK among the big countries of the EU 
15 are unambiguously the best. One has to keep in mind in this regard that the UK does not 
belong to the euro area and that, as such, its economic system is ruled by another economic 
constitution, namely a “golden rule” for public finances (while government consumption has to 
be balanced, pubic investment can be in deficit) and a subtle constrained discretion model for its 
central bank, independent in terms of means (“instrument independence”) but not in terms of 
objectives and accountable to public authorities (“goal independence”). 
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Having presented what we believe to be convincing empirical evidence of the existence of the 
“size nexus” in the euro area, we now turn to its consequences for the stability of the European 
monetary union under the current economic constitutional regime.  
 
 
The ox, the frog and the road to tax and social competition  
 
In his famous fable, “The Frog who Aspired to Become as Big as the Ox,” La Fontaine warned 
courtesans of the vital danger of trying to become, blinded by ambition, what they were not. We 
would like in this sub-Section to articulate the same warning in the EU case, although in the 
opposite direction. The EU is essentially a big closed economy. Its degree of openness is close to 
that of the largest of its members. Following our argument, it means that it should allow for 
macroeconomic policies in order to make the most of its domestic market. Otherwise, in 
pretending to be a frog while it is an ox, or in applying economic rules made for small economies 
while it is a large economy, it takes the risk of structurally jeopardizing its growth. “Millian 
growth” is not suited for the euro area in the long-run.  
 
This is not to say that “Millian growth” has not produced some success. The case of Ireland 
presented in Chart XXI is nothing less than spectacular. 
 
[Chart XXI here] 
 
The country is EU’ s greatest economic success and best argument for (small) new comers: the 
country was among the poorest among Western nations before joining the EU (and then the 
euro area) and is now only second to Luxembourg in terms of GDP per capita. There is no doubt 
that it was its integration into the Single market that explains its economic success, while its 
openness is the major feature of its economic structure. The economic constitutional provisions 
of the EU, the free trade and macroeconomic constraints they entail, fit (and actually shaped) 
Ireland’s economic strategy perfectly well. The downside is that Ireland accounts for less than 2 
percent of EU 12 total GDP, which is ultimately the Single market on which Ireland itself 
depends, along with all the other small states of the EU. Chart XXII shows how GDP is 
distributed in the euro area. The three largest countries represent 71 percent of the total. The  
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reason why the European economic constitution appears inefficient is thus straightforward in our 
view: it is ill-suited for 71 percent of the economic area it rules.  
 
[Chart XXII here] 
 
The paradox and the peril of the situation is that large countries are domestic-driven economies, 
as shown in Chart XXII, which small countries depend on, as shown on Table VII (while the 
opposite is not true), but that the European economic constitution is made of rules for small 
open economies. 
 
[Table VII here] 
 
Another way of looking at the problem is to say that a small country does not need 
macroeconomic stabilization instruments the way a large one does.
72 The tools available to adjust 
to a negative macroeconomic shock (recession and rise of unemployment) are not of the same 
essence, and thus of the same effects, than for a large one. Because its economy is largely open, 
regarding goods and services as well as foreign direct investments and other capital flows, a fiscal 
policy will have little effect on domestic demand for a small economy, since most of its impact 
will be absorbed through imports. 
 
Hence, for a small open economy, traditional fiscal policy of the Keynesian kind will usually be of 
little efficiency, whereas all policies that improve the competitiveness of the national economy by 
lowering production costs of firms located in the domestic economy are relatively more powerful: 
this may explain why fiscal consolidations in small countries have been found to have “non-
Keynesian” effects in the EU; it also suggests that tax competition, “structural reforms” and wage 
moderation policies will all have very powerful, positive effects for a small open economy, both 
because domestic demand represent a fraction of demand to domestic firms and because the 
elasticity of the supply of external capital –  in particular foreign direct investments – is higher, 
the smaller and the more open the economy is. In addition, policies that lower production costs 
in a small economy do not harm domestic demand very much, and they have little incidence on 
domestic inflation, so that they do not raise real interest rates, as nominal rates in a monetary 
union tend to be uniform across countries and to be relatively less influenced by the policies of a 
single, small country. 
                                                           
72 See Le Cacheux (2005b).  
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For large countries on the contrary, free riding is impossible and the various policies reviewed 
above tend to be more costly, or even counterproductive for the economic system. Keynesian-
style demand-management policies, especially fiscal policies, are more efficient for large relatively 
closed economies than for small open economies. On the other hand, all policies tending to 
lower production costs are less effective, and they all tend to lead to a lower domestic inflation, 
which then results in a higher real interest rate, so that they tend to be costly in terms of 
economic activity and growth.  
 
The fate of Germany over the past few years seems to be a perfect illustration of this difficulty of 
large countries in an economic and monetary union regulated by the rules of the kind of 
European economic constitution. The “frog strategy” adopted by the largest Euro area country 
(see Chart XXIII) consists in lowering its labor costs to gain export competitiveness. But its 
growth crucially depends on domestic demand. Hence Germany, against its economic nature, 
behaves like a small country.  
 
[Chart XXIII here] 
 
The incentive system devised by the European economic constitution is thus likely to damage 
growth performance in the EU even further. Small countries could be tempted, like Ireland, to 
engage in tax and fiscal competition, hoping that retaliation from the large countries will not 
come. Large countries, behaving like small countries and thus trying to compete using “social 
disinflation” rather than exchange-rate policy, would adopt competitiveness policies focused on 
labor cost reduction and welfare state roll-back policies. Since they are not small, they will trigger 
strategic reaction from other large countries, who in turn will engage in the race to the bottom.  
Some elements of this worst-case scenario have already appeared (see Laurent, 2006). 
 
It should be noted here that social-tax competition acts as a “shadow constitution” for 
redistribution policies in the EU, as noted by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). It constitutes a set 
of invisible but effective rules imposed on social policies.
73 It should also be stated that, if this 
dynamic could be further influenced by the Eastern enlargement, it does not at all seem to result 
from it, but from the economic constitutional regime chosen by Western member states of the 
EU 25 when they were the EU 15. 
                                                           
73 See Laurent (2006).  
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This system, if not reformed, could eventually lead to the transformation of the EU 12 into a low 
growth non-cooperative area
74 whose existence could quickly become uncertain, the fate of the 
small countries not being any better than that of the large.
75 
 
In the face of the evidence presented in this and the previous section, it is quite hard to believe 
that the EU has reached a “stable and attractive” “constitutional compromise” that it would be 
irresponsible to “upset” (Moravcsik, 2005b). On the contrary, one is inclined to search for 
solutions to the present and mostly future instability of the European polity induced by the unfair 
and inefficient European economic constitution. We finally turn to two possible ways of re-
contracting the European economic constitution.  
 
7. Economic democracy and federalism: The “Great compromise” vs. the 
“European economic constitution(s)” 
 
 
In the previous Sections of this paper, we have attempted to show that the trade-off between 
integrity and efficiency in the EU was sub-optimal: while integrity costs seem very high, efficiency 
benefits seem very low. In our view, the serious crisis in which the EU is engaged since May 2005 
has no other fundamental explanation. We believe, like Paul Romer, that “a crisis is a terrible 
thing to waste.” We thus finally offer in this section two original ways out of the current 
European predicament, taking into account the necessity of reconciling unity in the EU with 
diversities in both social model and size.  
 
We first try to formalize a starting point for policy, in the framework of the integrity-efficiency 
trade-off. The EU is confronted with four possibilities in the space defined by the integrity-
efficiency trade-off (see Chart XXIV).  
 
 
[Chart XXIV here] 
 
                                                           
74 The scenario of a competitive Europe was first presented by Fitoussi (1999). See also Le Cacheux and 
Saint-Etienne (2005) and Laurent (2005b). 
75 Fontagné (2004) shows how the “Luxembourg model” has developed a fatigue of its own.  
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The first one is the status quo, which, given our arguments in Section 6, isn’t really a possibility. 
An un-reformed European economic constitution would plunge the EU into tax and social 
competition and eventually result in des-integration (less integrity; less efficiency). Another choice 
would be to regain some integrity (i.e. national sovereignty) but, if un-coordinated, this risks 
jeopardizing the global efficiency of the EU (and euro area) and finally not be very different from 
the pseudo-status quo of tax and social competition (less efficiency; more integrity).  
 
The two remaining choices imply political re-contracting, i.e. the drafting of a new European 
economic constitution. The first method on this path consists of acknowledging the discrepancy 
between the “size nexus” and the size-blind economic rules of the European economic 
constitution and the role it plays in diminishing the efficiency of the EU. It implies discriminating 
among European countries on the basis of size, and thus sacrificing some integrity (understood 
here as equality between member states with respect to the choice of economic constitutional 
provisions) to gain some efficiency. We call this solution the “Great (European) compromise” 
(less integrity; more efficiency, cf. infra).  
 
The last solution is our preferred solution since it would allow progress both in terms of integrity 
and efficiency. It would consist of giving a full autonomy to the euro area inside the EU 25, 
thereby distinguishing between the EU 25 and the EU 12 in terms of choice of constitutional 
economic provisions. Furthermore, this solution implies what we call a “small compromise” 
among EU 12 member states, recognizing the importance of the “size nexus” (which explains 
why, graphically, the frontier between “Great compromise” and “European economic 
constitutions” is porous). The reason why this last solution would be able to improve both 
integrity and efficiency, is that it is likely to minimize both integrity and efficiency costs, or, to say 
it differently, to expand the trade-off frontier between efficiency and integrity.  
 
Before developing these two ways out of the current European crisis in detail, we first have to 
characterize empirically the context in which they could be undertaken. That is, the spectacular 
rise of the number of small states in the EU, changing the democratic balance between economic 
and political power both in the EU 25 and EU 12. In other words, the “size nexus” to be taken 
into account in economic policies, has first to be taken into account in terms of policy-making.  
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The rise of the smalls in the EU 
 
To fully understand why size matters and is likely to matter even more in the future, one should 
actually keep in mind the spectacular contemporary evolution of the number of small and large 
countries in the EU (see Chart XXV). 
 
[Chart XXV here] 
 
Started in the 1950s with only six countries, three of which were “large” and three “small,” the 
European integration process has progressively included more and more countries but mostly  
“small” states, that have come to represent 50 percent, 60 percent, 66 percent and finally 76 
percent of the total. Chart XXIII shows that the tipping point of the contemporary European 
Union (and of the future euro area) in this respect seems to be 1995, when Finland, Austria and 
Sweden joined the EU (Finland and Austria later joining the euro area). As shown in Table II & 
III, the EU and the euro area respectively encompass now, at the end of this evolution, 19 and 8 
small states, 2 and 1 medium state and 4 and 3 large states.  
 
As noted in Alesina and Spolaore (2003), the emergence since 1945 of a large number of 
economically highly integrated and “small” countries is a global, and not only European,   
phenomenon, corresponding to a simultaneous “economic integration” and “political 
disintegration”. The specificity of the EU “small” states however is that, being the product of the 
two former evolutions, they have then been able to re-integrate themselves in the framework of a 
political regime where they have acquired a power unrelated to their demographic and economic 
size. The idea of the “Great compromise” would be precisely to re-balance the EU in favor of 
the large states, in the name of “efficiency.”  
 
 
A “great (European) compromise”  
 
“The federal system was created in order to combine the various advantages of largeness with 
those of smallness”
76 argues Tocqueville in the Chapter VIII, Volume I of his Democracy in 
                                                           
76 Op. cit., p. 182.  
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America. If that is so, given the degree of economic integration achieved in the EU, an agreement 
between small and large countries should be possible for the sake of mutual benefit.  
 
But first, one should take the measure of the problem at stake, namely the imbalance of power 
between small and large states in the EU, or more precisely, between economic size and political 
size in the EU. While small European states are “magnified” by the EU decision-making system 
in the EU 12 and the EU 25, large European states appear to be “shrunk” when their economic 
and political size is compared in the euro area and in the EU (see Table VIII for the EU 12 and 
Table IX for the EU 25).  
 
[Tables VIII & IX here] 
 
This imbalance results in the fact that economic majority and political majority are far from being 
synchronized in the EU 12 and the EU 25 (see Table X). 
 
[Table X here] 
 
Table X shows that 74 percent of the economic size in the EU 25 corresponds to 38 percent to 
48 percent of the political size depending on the measure chosen. In the EU 12, 71 percent of the 
economic size corresponds to 21 percent to 27 percent of the political size (the majority being at 
30 percent). Conversely, a solid “economic majority” (56 percent of economic size) represents 23 
percent to 32 percent of political size in the EU 25 and 14 percent to 18 percent (compared to a 
total of 60 percent) in the EU 12. 
 
We should clarify the choice of economic size rather than demographic size for comparison with 
political size (even if when they are expressed in percentage terms, they only differ little).  
 
The issue of size in the EU is almost always considered, in the political and academic field, from 
the strictly political point of view. The reason for this is that voting rights are legally distributed in 
the EU Treaty according to a “principle of population:” the larger the state in terms of 
inhabitants, the higher the number of votes. But this criterion does not fit in our framework. Our 
focus in this paper is the EU as an economic democracy between states (as we have tried to 
define it with the criteria of “integrity” and “efficiency”). While models to build political voice  
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and assess EU’s democratic character typically rely on demographic size, we thus prefer the 
criterion of economic size, in relation to our argument in Section 6.  
 
What would be the point of a “Great European compromise?” For scholars of the history of 
federal states and institutions, this reference is no surprise (see Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2004c) 
for the “Great compromise” was the name given to the agreement reached in July 1787 between 
small and large states in the Philadelphia Convention. The “Virginia Plan,” devised by James 
Madison and presented by Edmund Randolph to preserve the interest of the large states in the 
Union, equated political power (in the Congress) with demographic size. As such, it was rejected 
by smaller states. They instead proposed the “New Jersey Plan,” drafted by William Paterson, 
which would leave the structure of Congress unchanged, with each state having one vote. The 
famous solution later proposed by Roger Sherman, that eventually became the constitutional one, 
balanced the proportional (“apportioned”) representation of the House of representatives with 
the equal representation in the Senate (one state, two votes). What form could such an 
agreement, designed to restore efficiency to the European economic constitutional provisions by 
reducing the power of small states, take in the European Union? Can one imagine a compromise 
between an “Ireland Plan” and a “Germany Plan?” 
 
To have a clear idea of the possibility of reaching such an agreement, one can briefly look back at 
the tumultuous recent history of decision-making in the EU. The substantial efficiency, as we 
have tried to define it (see Section 2 and Section 6), was actually never considered with respect to 
size. But the formal efficiency of constitutional rules, i.e. the fact that they could allow (or not) 
for decisions to be taken (whatever their content) has been at the centre of a heated debate 
between small, medium and large states in the EU in the recent period. 
 
Because they were aware of the increased difficulty of making collective decisions in a Union that 
was to become more numerous and more heterogeneous, the national governments of the EU15 
countries had decided to reform the decision-making rules of the Council before enlarging the 
EU. Indeed, this reform was the major, if not only, objective of the Intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) convened in 2000 to draft what was to become the Nice Treaty.  
 
But the weighting scheme and the triple threshold for qualified majority (72 percent of the votes 
in the Council, representing at least 50 percent of the member states and at least 62 percent of 
the EU population) agreed upon are highly complex and hardly transparent. They mostly make it  
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fairly easy for countries to form a blocking minority coalition, so that the decision-making 
process is most likely not to be efficient.
77 Adopted precipitously without any simulation of how 
it would actually function, this qualified majority rule immediately appeared to be too complex, 
inefficient and probably inconsistent in a Union of 25 or more members (Baldwin and Widgrén, 
2004a). Realizing that Nice rules would not be sustainable, the European Convention tried to 
address this issue but did not eventually manage to propose a satisfying “great compromise” 
between European nations.  
 
The Convention proposed a simpler and apparently more efficient rule: a double majority 
threshold, with 50 percent of the member states representing at least 60 percent of the EU 
population. But these lower thresholds gave more power – especially veto power – to “large” 
member states, thus relatively weakening the blocking powers of coalitions of “small” member 
states, but mostly that of the two “medium” countries – Poland and Spain – which benefit the 
most from the compromise reached in Nice (Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2004b and 2004c). In 
addition, the efficiency gain compared to the Nice decision rules, although real, was actually not 
very significant (Baldwin and Widgrén, 2004b). 
 
Following the failure of the Brussels summit in December 2003, mostly due to the opposition of 
the Polish and Spanish governments to what was clearly a loss of influence of these countries 
compared to what they had gained in Nice, a new round of negotiations, this time within the 
Intergovernmental conference, led to the adoption of higher thresholds for the double majority 
rule in the Council. The majority rule adopted in the ECT (and presented in its Article I-25) was 
the following:  
 
 
 
1. A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, 
comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 
% of the population of the Union. A blocking minority must include at least four Council 
members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained. 
 
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, when the Council does not act on a proposal 
from the Commission or from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the qualified 
majority shall be defined as at least 72 % of the members of the Council, representing 
Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union. 
                                                           
77 On the probabilities of reaching decision on collective issues with the qualified majority rules of the 
Nice Treaty, see Bobay (2001) and (2004). 
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3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply to the European Council when it is acting by a qualified 
majority. 
 
 
Whereas the double majority rule that had been originally proposed by the Convention – 50 
percent of the member states representing at least 60 percent of the EU population – could be 
regarded as both simple and potentially more efficient than the qualified majority rules of the 
Nice Treaty, the thresholds finally adopted represented actually a small progress. According to 
the calculations made by Baldwin and Widgrén (2004b), the probability of reaching collective 
decisions would have risen from about 5 percent under Nice rules to a little less than 10 percent 
under the new rules with the 25 present member states, and even slightly more with 27 or 28 
(including Turkey, in this case).
78 With the already signed accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the 
double majority thresholds amount to 15 states and at least 310 millions EU citizens; and if 
Turkey were to join, the thresholds would be 15 states and at least 360 millions EU citizens.  
 
An additional condition, adopted at the end of the IGC negotiations in Brussels in June 2004, 
stated that a blocking minority had to include at least four states, a condition that turns out to be 
binding only for “large” countries, but not for “small” ones. In order to illustrate the properties 
of this particular double majority rule, and especially the numerous possibilities of forming 
blocking coalitions, we may give a few examples. A coalition of the six founding countries 
(Germany, Benelux, France and Italy), or even one that would not include France or Italy, could 
oppose any decision in the Council; the same could be achieved by a coalition of the 12 new 
members in the enlarged Union at 27, or indeed any coalition representing at least 170 millions 
citizens; and in a situation like that prevailing in the Spring of 2003, Italy, Poland, Spain and the 
UK could have opposed any common decision on Iraq. 
 
Now that the ECT is invalidated, the EU is back to the Nice Treaty rules, which are certainly 
worse in terms of efficiency than the first Convention compromise, but not that far from the 
second one, eventually proposed for ratification. The problem of efficiency, considered from a 
strictly formal point of view remains, and the risk of paralysis of the EU under the Nice rules are 
high. 
 
                                                           
78 See also the calculations performed by Bobay (2004). The author reaches similar conclusions concerning 
the decision-making efficiency of the rules eventually included in the ECT and insists on the power gained 
by “small” states. 
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Furthermore, the sequence of bargaining on political size opened by the prospect of a new 
European constitution illustrate the difficulty of negotiating in a more numerous and diverse EU 
than ever before. Achieving a European “Great compromise” could thus prove very difficult for 
the very reason it is necessary: the imbalance between small and large states and the existence of 
medium ones as potential veto players. Table XI shows that one important reason why the US 
succeeded in reaching an agreement between small and large states was their almost perfect 
balance, reducing the veto power of the medium states. 
 
 
 [Table XI here] 
 
But a more fundamental question is to determine, not if a “Great compromise” in the EU 25 is 
possible, but if it is desirable, i.e. whether a rebalance of power in favor of large states would be 
enough to insure that more balanced constitutional rules might be chosen. Here, one has to 
remember that the small economy rules that have been chosen for the EU 12 and that appear so 
harmful for its economic performances have been essentially pushed forward by France and 
Germany. So, ultimately, the reason why a “Great compromise” appears unlikely to trigger 
efficiency is because large states could well end up not choosing the good rules for themselves.  
 
However, the growing opposition between large and small countries in the EU should not be 
understated. The vote of 25 November 2003 on the SGP can be read as a (nuanced) size-driven 
opposition between France and Germany (that did not take part in the final vote) on the one 
hand (supported by Italy and Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece), and The 
Netherlands, Finland, Austria and Spain on the other hand, which voted against the conclusions 
of the EU Council suspending the sanctions contained in the excessive deficit procedure.  
 
Second, if a global reform appears unlikely, some incremental improvements toward a new 
balance between “large” and “small” states in the EU on the basis of economic size seem 
possible. An interesting reform in this respect regards the European central bank that modified 
its status in April 2003, introducing for the first time in relation to the enlargement of the euro 
area the criterion of economic size instead of population (or demographic size) and recognizing a 
specific status to the five countries with the highest GDP in the euro area (Art. 10.2):  
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Each member of the Governing Council shall have one vote. As from the date on which 
the number of members of the Governing Council exceeds 21, each member of the 
Executive Board shall have one vote and the number of governors with a voting right 
shall be 15. The latter voting rights shall be assigned and shall rotate as follows: 
 
– as from the date on which the number of governors exceeds 15, until it reaches 22, the 
governors shall be allocated to two groups, according to a ranking of the size of the share 
of their national central bank’s Member State in the aggregate gross domestic product at 
market prices and in the total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial 
institutions of the Member States which have adopted the euro. The shares in the 
aggregate gross domestic product at market prices and in the total aggregated balance 
sheet of the monetary financial institutions shall be assigned weights of 5/6 and 1/6, 
respectively. The first group shall be composed of five governors and the second group 
of the remaining governors.  
 
 
In this respect, Table VIII and X show that beyond (or more accurately within) the question of 
the balance between small and large countries in the EU lies the question of the balance between 
the EU and the euro area. This leads us to our final argument: the constitutional differentiation 
of the euro area, or the implementation of the European economic constitutions. 
 
 
The European economic constitution(s)  
 
Admiring the young states of the new American republic, Tocqueville (mistakenly) remarked in 
Chapter VIII, Volume I of his Democracy in America that “One is much like another. Their mores, 
ideas, and needs are homogeneous. Though some are larger than others, differences of size alone 
have not given rise to strongly opposing interests.”
79 
 
Uniting the euro area countries enough by giving them a true economic sovereignty so that the 
difference in their sizes would not be a threat to the future of the EU is the idea behind the 
“European economic constitution(s).”  
 
Going back to Table VIII and Table X, it appears that the euro area is heavily dependent on the 
EU for the implementation of its own policies. Given the concentric circles structure of the 
European economic constitution (see Chart VIII), this is not surprising. But the imbalance 
between the economic size and the political size in the euro area and the EU is as striking as that 
between small and large countries in the EU. Actually, members of the euro area only account for 
                                                           
79 Op. cit., p. 134.  
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60 percent of its political size in the Council. While the Council makes decisions that allow for a 
certain degree of autonomy of the euro area on the policy level, the dependence of the euro area 
on the constitutional level is total. EU 12 countries can not choose their Economic constitution 
without the agreement of the 13 other countries and of the ECB (cf. Table I).  
 
Furthermore, Table X shows that the consistency between economic size and political size is not 
better in the EU 12 than in the EU 25, or, to say the same thing differently, that the EU 12 is not 
more integrated politically than the EU 25, while it is much more integrated economically.  
 
Two imperatives thus finally appear. The first is to better differentiate the EU 12 within the EU 
25 in terms of economic constitutional choice; the second is to integrate the EU 12 politically at 
the level of its economic integration. This would provide the foundations for a sustainable 
economic and monetary union. These two ambitions can only be met through a differentiation 
between the two European economic constitutions corresponding to the EU 25 and the EU 12.  
 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) formalize the “optimal size” of countries in public economics terms 
as resulting from a trade-off between the efficiency of the provision of public goods (economies 
of scale) and the heterogeneity of preferences. This is a generalization of the classic argument of 
the economic federalism theory
80 on the optimal level of public policy within federations 
(“subsidiarity” in EU parlance). In the constitutional framework that we have chosen, this 
optimal trade-off is between efficiency and integrity. In theory, it should in fact be related to the 
issue of optimal (external) size. There should be a coalition of countries that, given their 
characteristics in terms of diversity both according to their social model and their size, makes it 
possible to minimize integrity and efficiency costs. Once more, we turn to Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962) to illustrate this idea of an “optimal constitution” in the EU (see Chart XXVI). 
 
[Chart XXVI here] 
 
How do we define the boundaries of this coalition of countries, or, to put it in Buchanan’s (1965) 
terms, how do we justify an “optimal exclusion” (and inclusion) in the EU? There, we have to 
add to our normative framework an unmistakable positive reality: twelve EU countries have 
already decided to give up their monetary sovereignty to form the euro area. The question is thus 
not how to form the coalition of countries that would minimize integrity and efficiency costs, but 
                                                           
80 See Oates (1999).   
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how to effectively reduce integrity and efficiency costs for this coalition given the fact that it 
exists. As argued, the two steps in this direction would have to be autonomy and integration.  
 
Autonomy in the constitutional choice of economic policies rules implies that integrity and 
efficiency costs would be reduced simultaneously by respecting two conditions. The first is that 
the rules chosen in the euro area are general and take into account the size of member states. 
This means that euro area countries should reform the rules of monetary and fiscal policies in the 
course of a “small compromise” leading to an efficient and proactive macroeconomic framework. 
It should be easier than a “great compromise” because of the presence of only 66 percent of 
small states and 1 medium state in the euro area, instead of 76 percent and 2 medium member 
states in the EU as a whole. Only then would the large and small states be on an equal footing.  
 
Since the UK and Poland remain outside the euro area, the latter comprises 4 of the 6 large 
countries of the EU. If the UK and Poland keep their macroeconomic autonomy and use it to 
compensate the handicap of their size in the Single market, giving the euro area an economic 
constitution respecting the integrity and efficiency principles makes it possible to ease the 
consequences of the “size nexus.”  
 
A further important question would be to know what kind of rules a European economic 
constitution for the euro area should have. There, a trade-off in the trade-off could appear 
between revision and neutrality, the euro area members being able to take the risk of political 
integration (with a revisable economic constitution) because preferences would become close 
enough under the effect of more neutral rules. In the classical terms of federalism, this idea 
means allowing for homogenous preferences to form at the level where externalities and 
economies of scale occur. An important step toward further integration once autonomy is gained 
would be to define “European public goods” financed by a real autonomous budget paid for by a 
unified corporate tax (see Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2004).  
 
Two different economic constitutions should thus be implemented in the EU 25. The first one, 
the “EU economic constitution,” would be submitted to the EU 25 member states and legally 
bind them. Including the main elements of the first historical economic constitution, it would 
combine the regulations of the Single market (and the competition policy attached to it) with a 
reformed EU budget (see Le Cacheux 2005). Member states should be left free regarding their 
macroeconomic policies.   
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The second economic constitution would really be the “euro area Constitution.” Submitted only 
to the ratification of euro area members and amendable by them only, it would be revisable 
through qualified majority and include neutral and efficient provisions regarding monetary, 
exchange rate and fiscal policies taking into account size.
81 
 
In the end, the major reason why the “European constitution(s)” solution seems better suited for 
the EU is that it answers our “integrity” and “size nexus” concerns in a less costly way, in 
efficiency sense, than the “Great compromise.”  
 
 
 
8. Epilogue: 1955 or 1965? 
 
The solutions proposed to the current predicament of the EU (which present crisis is a symptom 
of) rely ultimately on one possibly heroic assumption: that the EU has the political resources to 
invent innovative new political paths into the future. If the time is 1955, at the moment when the 
Messina conference opened the way for the Treaty of Rome after the European Defense 
Community crisis, then our optimism is justified. If the time is 1965, when the “Luxembourg 
compromise” blocked the way of European integration, that only the Single Act, 20 years later, 
revived, then it is simply, for now, misplaced.  
 
                                                           
81 See Laurent & Le Cacheux (2004a), (2004b) and (2004c).  
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Chart I 
A LARGE AND WIDESPREAD SUPPORT 
FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN FRANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 63 carried out between 9 May and 14 June 2005, July 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/.  
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Chart II 
A LARGE AND WIDESPREAD SUPPORT  
FOR EU MEMBERSHIP IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 63 carried out between 9 May and 14 June 2005, July 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/.  
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Chart III 
THE FRENCH RAISONS 
 
 
 
 
 
                       “Economic voting” motives  
                  
                   “Sovereignism” motives  
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 63 carried out between 9 May and 14 June 2005, July 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/.  
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Chart IV 
EXPLAINING THE DUTCH “NEE”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
                       “Economic voting” motives  
                  
                   “Sovereignism” motives  
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 63 carried out between 9 May and 14 June 2005, July 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/. 
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Chart V 
THE BROAD SUPPORT IN THE EU FOR A EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 
 
 
 
    France referendum result                                       The Netherlands referendum result 
 
                                    
 
“It is necessary to emphasise that this result must not be seen as an intention of how respondents 
would vote in a possible referendum in the countries which are considering or are planning to 
organise such a consultation on the Constitutional Treaty. It reflects only the extent to which 
respondents agree with the actual concept of a Constitution for the European Union.” 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 63 carried out between 9 May and 14 June 2005, July 2005, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/.  
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Chart VI 
EU POLITICS AND ECONOMICS: WHERE DO WE STAND 
 
 
 
 
 
Citizens
Governments
ECB 
European economic policies
Commission
Monetary/ 
exchange rate policy 
Single 
market 
Integrity and efficiency
Input legitimacy
EU 
Budget 
Legitimacy
Constitutional discipline
Output legitimacy 
National social policies 
 
SGP 
Council European Parliament 
European economic constitution
1
2
3
           
    
 
69
Chart VII 
THE TWO AGES OF ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EUROPE  
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82 Quotations and articles refer to the EUT, see footnote 20. 
83 The EU trade policy is not included here because it is an external policy. Nor are included the “strategy for employment” and the “open method of coordination” which both lack 
strong constitutional foundations.  
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“All items of revenue and 
expenditure of the Community, 
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ECJ Chart VIII 
“HARD” AND “SOFT” ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM  
IN THE EU
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Note: members of the ERM II (the exchange rate mechanism based on stable  but  adjustable                       
central rates to the euro for the participating currencies) form an intermediary or transit area between the 
euro area and the EU 25 as a whole. EU countries outside the euro area (whether in the ERM II or not) 
must comply with the rules of the Single market and participate in the EU budget. In addition, they must 
present budgetary programs reflecting “convergence” (and not strictly “stability” as for the members of 
the euro area) of their public finances toward the criteria of the SGP. Convergence programs must also 
present the medium-term monetary policy objectives and the relationship of those objectives to price and 
exchange rate stability. 
                                                           
84 As of March 2006. 
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Chart IX 
THE “PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRITY” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Buchanan and Tullock (1962).  
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Chart X 
THE “PRINCIPLE OF EFFICIENCY” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Buchanan and Tullock (1962).  
Efficiency costs 
0 
Paralysis/divergence 
Autarchy
Number of (diverse) EU member states  
involved in collective action  
 
75
 Chart XI 
THE EURO AREA: NOT GROWING, NOR DEVELOPING... 
The dismal decade
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Chart XII 
...NOR CONVERGING. 
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Source: Eurostat. 
s.d. 96* = 0.98 
s.d. 03* = 0.95
s.d. 95 = 18.2 
s.d. 03 = 17.9 
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Table II 
DEMOGRAPHIC SIZE IN THE EU 25 (AND EU 12) IN 2003  
 
                                                   in million 
Country 
 
Population * 
Malta   0.4 
Luxembourg   0.4 
Cyprus   0.7 
Estonia   1.4 
Slovenia   2.0 
Latvia   2.3 
Lithuania   3.5 
Ireland  4.0 
Finland   5.2 
Slovakia   5.4 
Denmark   5.4 
Austria   8.1 
Sweden   8.9 
Hungary   10.1 
Czech Republic   10.2 
Belgium   10.4 
Portugal   10.4 
Greece   11.0 
Netherlands   16.2 
 
Poland  
 
38.2 
Spain   40.7 
 
Italy  
 
57.3 
United Kingdom  59.3 
France   59.6 
Germany  
 
 
 Euro area members in bold. 
82.5 
 
 
* As of January 1, 2003. 
      
Note: A “small” state is defined as one with a population inferior to the fourth of the population of the 
biggest state. A “medium” state is defined as one with a population inferior to half of the population of 
the biggest state. “Large” states are those remaining. 
 
 «MEDIUM»  
          (2, 1) 
    «SMALL» 
       (19, 8) 
     «LARGE» 
          (4, 3)  
 
 
 
20 m 
 
  41 m  
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Table III 
ECONOMIC SIZE IN THE EU 25 IN 2003 
(GDP AT 1995 MARKET PRICE) 
 
 
            in million euros 
 
Country 
 
 
Malta 3060.0 
Estonia 4587.5 
Latvia  6006.9 
Lithuania  7473.4 
Cyprus  9141.7 
Slovakia  20157.2 
Slovenia 20547.5 
Luxembourg  20822.5 
Hungary 45952.8 
Czech Republic  49084.2 
Ireland  94028.1 
Portugal  100791.6 
Greece  120580.7 
Finland  132971.4 
Poland 141918.2 
Denmark 161290.0 
Austria  218603.4 
Sweden 232715.9 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
249184.9 
386653.6 
   
 
Spain  591615.8 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
944964.5 
UK 1086470.6
France  1442220.8
Germany  2159784.9
 
 
 Euro area members in bold. 
 
 
Note: A “small” state is defined as one with a GDP inferior to the fourth of the GDP of the biggest state. 
A “medium” state is defined as one with a GDP inferior to half of the GDP of the biggest state. “Large” 
states are those remaining. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
«MEDIUM»  
(1, 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
539946 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        1079892 
 
    «SMALL» 
      (20, 8) 
«LARGE» 
(4, 3) 
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Chart XIII 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” IN THE EU 12: A SIMPLE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*: Empirical sign of the relation (see infra). 
**: Number of EU 12 countries for which a significant relation was empirically found (see infra).
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Box I 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” IN THE EU 12: A BASIC EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
 
 
 
— The data — 
 
Given the small number of countries belonging to the euro area (12 in 2006) and its young age (the Euro 
was launched in 1999 and became public in 2002), a lot of studies assessing the performance of the 
European economy crucially rely on “subjective data,” following the concepts developed and publicized 
by the OECD. The most widely used are, quantitatively, the “output gap” (and its derivatives: “structural” 
growth, “structural” unemployment…) and, qualitatively, “labor market rigidity” indexes (such as 
“employment protection,” “coordination,” “centralization”…). 
 
In order to test our hypotheses we have chosen instead to rely on (the most possible) “objective” and 
recent freely available data. They largely come from Eurostat (with the exception of “openness” data, 
which come from OECD). This choice has its own serious limitations.  
 
Our data cover the 1996-2003/2004 period. This is the only timeframe where two conditions are satisfied 
in order to evaluate the effects of the European economic constitution and the related issue of (country) 
size. First, the European economic constitution, partly implemented in 1993 and renewed in 1992 (see 
Section 4), is in place by the beginning of the period and fully in effect by the middle of it. Second, a 
certain convergence has taken place before the beginning of our period (although we show that it was not 
deepened by the European economic constitution).  
 
Our dataset comprises 11 of the 12 euro area countries. We have chosen not to include Spain because it is 
the only “medium” country of the EU12. Our results thus really shed light on the gap in performance 
between “large” (the “big 3”) and “small” (the “small 8”) countries of the euro area.    
 
If size really matters, as we argue, then our results could be very fragile. The dataset on which we perform 
our estimations can indeed seem very small by the standard of contemporary econometrics. However, one 
should keep in mind that ours is not a sample, but the population itself. By the same token, the exclusion 
of one or more outliers in some regressions is in our view counterbalanced by their economic significance. 
None do encompass less than 94 percent of the EU 11 GDP, 62 percent of the small states and 100 
percent of large states. Furthermore, even if the number of observations is obviously small, each is an 
average calculated on the 1996-2004 period. Finally, correlation coefficients and individual coefficients 
obtained are quite strong. To further allow the reader to test the validity of our methodology, we have 
added a table containing our data that we use to compare them to other countries outside the euro area 
(Table V and Section 6). It shows that “estimations” provided by means are close to those obtained by 
OLS regression.  
 
 
— The theoretical framework — 
 
The issue is to determine how our theoretical framework (described in Chart XIII) compares to standard 
economic theory. Two questions emerge. The first one is the relation between population and growth 
levels. We assume that the two are highly correlated and that population causes GDP levels and not the 
other way around. In doing so, we rely on the basic assumptions underlying the standard production 
function that relates population (labor, skilled or not), capital and technical progress to output. But one 
could then argue that population should be represented by the labor force and not total population.  
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However this measure would only account for production and not consumption, while we are interested 
in the size of the domestic market.  
 
Another related question is how to avoid the reverse causation between size and macroeconomic 
performance. If GDP levels are used as the size variable, then high inflation and low public deficit could 
cause high GDP levels, and not the reverse. This is why we use demographic size as a proxy for economic 
size. Demographic size is almost perfectly correlated to economic size and the direction of this correlation 
is un-ambiguous. The direction of the correlation between demographic size and economic performances 
is also un-ambiguous.  
 
A further assumption is that since demographic size is a proxy for economic size, economic size is 
mediated by openness, which effect on growth captures both the importance of openness and, conversely, 
the importance of the domestic market. We can indeed write approximately that GDP = domestic market 
+ trade with the world. Hence that domestic market = GDP-openness (defined as the trade to GDP 
ratio).  
 
Our measure of demographic size, in percentage of the total, is unconventional. As explained in Section 6, 
we wanted a comparative measure of demographic size and not an absolute one (like logs of population), 
i.e. a significant measure of the weight of each country in the euro area. 
 
 
— The models —  
 
We estimate four models:  
 
1) The first one reveals approximations and mediations between demographic size, economic size and 
openness when regressed on real economic growth (Table VI-A);  
 
2) The second one attempts to test the quality of the univariate regression of size on growth by 
confronting it to two other hypotheses: the “social nexus” and the endogenous growth theory (Table VI-
B);  
 
3) In the third, which is two-fold (Table VI-C & Table VI-D), inflation and public deficit regressions are 
tested to see if the only effect of openness on their variances runs through growth or if a direct effect of 
size exists on either or both;  
 
4) Finally, size regressions on unemployment and long-term unemployment are tested against the “social 
nexus” hypothesis (Table VI-E & Table VI-F).  
 
 
 
— The results —  
 
- We first find, as expected, that size influences real growth in the EU 12. Economic size is proxied by 
demographic size and size is mediated by openness in influencing the real growth of GDP.  
 
- Our results are also useful to understand the effect of size on the conduct of macroeconomic policy in 
the euro area. In particular, they reveal a systematic divergence between small and large countries in terms 
of inflation and public deficit. However, the inflation coefficient is weaker and more fragile than the 
public deficit coefficient, which appears on the contrary too strong. As regards inflation, the reason might 
be that the European economic and monetary integration has lowered the importance of domestic factors 
in predicting accurately inflation rates. Another explanation could be the consequence of competitive 
strategies undertaken by small countries in the European context. Whatever the reasons, the weakness of 
the coefficient must not lead to the conclusion that size and monetary policy are merely un-related. The 
consequence of a uniform restrictive monetary policy on large countries and on euro area weighted  
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growth appears very real (see Chart XVII). As for public deficits, the direct effect of size is positive: the 
bigger the economy, the larger the need for macro stabilization, the bigger the deficit. 
 
- We find that GDP per capita and real GDP growth are negatively correlated with size in the EU 12 and 
that openness is strongly and negatively correlated with size. Size, it seems, determines openness that in 
turn determines growth, inflation and public deficit performance. The results presented in Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003) suggest that GDP per capita and real GDP growth should be positively associated with 
size, but that openness*size should be negatively correlated with both, giving small open economies a 
comparative advantage in a globalized world. Our results being contradictory to this finding, we are able 
to interpret them as the symptom of the development of a specific kind of growth process in the euro area 
brought about by the implementation of the European economic constitution.  
 
- Our results, as limited as they are, could thus shed some light on the nature of the European growth. 
One would expect, according to a standard result of the endogenous growth theory, that GDP per capita 
and GDP levels would be connected to growth rates and, from there, to macroeconomic performances. 
As noted in Alesina, Spolaore & Warcziarg (2005), “scale effects may be more present in the increasing 
returns, endogenous growth phase that characterises advanced industrialized countries.” We find the 
opposite: GDP levels, represented by population levels, and GDP per capita levels, are negatively 
correlated to growth rates.  
 
The growth process in the EU therefore appears more “Smithian” than “Schumpeterian” (Parker, 1984), 
but in a very specific way. We propose to call it “Millian” in reference to the arguments developed by J. S. 
Mill on the impact of country size on trade benefits (see Section 6). Hence, the “Millian” growth in the 
EU designates the bias of the growth process in favor of small open countries that end up doing 
systematically better than large ones under the European economic constitution. The (Solow) hypothesis 
of a simple catch-up by small member states should be rejected both because of the dynamic shown in 
Table IV-A and IV-B and of the results of the regression of GDP per capita level on growth.  
 
- Finally, our last result regards the existence of a “social nexus” in the euro area. We find that the “size 
nexus” does a much better job at explaining differences in unemployment and long-term unemployment 
than a “social model” based explanation (see Charts XVIII to XX and Section 6 for an explanation).  
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Chart XIV 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” IN THE EU 12: DEVELOPMENT & GROWTH 
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Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 24.08 
Coefficient significant at 5 %. 
 
 
                              
Size and real growth
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Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 2.3 
Coefficient significant at 5 %. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Chart XV 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” IN THE EU 12: OPENNESS  
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OLS regression without Greece.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 42. 
Coefficient significant at 10 %. 
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OLS regression without Greece and Finland.   
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 21. 
Coefficient significant at 10%.   
 
Source: OECD. 
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Chart XVI 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” AND MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 
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OLS regression without Greece, Finland and Austria.   
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 0.73 
Coefficient significant at 10%.         
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OLS regression without Greece.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 3.12 
Coefficient significant at 1 %. 
   
Source: Eurostat. 
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Chart XVII 
THE “SIZE PENALTY” OF MONETARY POLICY 
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Table IV-A 
THE “SIZE NEXUS”: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
Productivity of labor 
(GDP per hour worked, in 1990 $) 
      
      
  1950 1973 1990  1998 
    
 
  
Austria    4.05  15.17  24.05  27.07 
Belgium 6.19  16.89  27.44  33.57 
Finland    4.28  13.81  20.27  25.69 
Ireland 3.73  9.84  21.66  27.05 
Netherlands   6.67  19.49  30.15  30.62 
 
Average Small 5* 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
15 
 
 
24.7 
 
 
28.8 
 
 
Italy 4.38  15.92  24.08  27.9 
France 5.82  18.02  29.47  33.72 
Germany 3.99  14.76  21.94  26.56 
       
Average Big 3   4.7  16.2  25.2  29.4 
 
Convergence 
diff. Small(s)-Large(s) 
 
 
0.25 
 
 
 
-1.19 
 
 
 
-0.45 
 
 
 
-0.59 
 
 
 
Convergence 
 (std. dev. EU 12*)  1.15  2.93  3.72  3.19 
       
Average EU 12*  4.89  15.49  24.88  29.02 
       
USA  12.65 23.72 30.10  34.55 
       
Catch-up  
(diff. USA-EU 12*)  7.76  8.23  5.22  5.53 
 
* No data for Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece. 
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Table IV-B 
THE “SIZE NEXUS”: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
GDP per capita 
(in 1990 $) 
      
      
  1950 1973 1990  1998 
    
 
  
Austria    3706  11235  16881  18905 
Belgium 5462  12170  17194  19442 
Finland    4253  11085  16868  18324 
Ireland 3446  6867  11825  18183 
Netherlands   5996  13082  17267  20224 
 
 
Average Small 5* 
 
 
4573 
 
 
10888 
 
 
16007 
 
 
19016 
 
 
Spain 2397  8739  12210  14227 
Italy 3502  10643  16320  17759 
France 5270  13123  18093  19558 
Germany 3881  11966  15932  17799 
       
Average Big 3   4218  11911  16782  18372 
 
Convergence 
diff. Small(s)-Large(s) 
 
355 
 
-1023 
 
-775 
 
644 
 
Convergence 
(std. dev. EU 12*)   993 1994  1919  903 
       
Average EU 12  4440  11271  16298  18774 
       
USA 9561  16689  23214  27331 
       
Catch-up  
(diff. USA-EU 12*)  5122 5418 6917  8557 
       
 
* No data for Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece. 
 
 
Note: according to Abramovitz (1989), “catch-up” is the narrowing of the productivity gap 
compared to the leading country and “convergence” is the narrowing of the gap among follower 
countries. 
 
Source: A. Madison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2001) and own 
computations.  
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Table V 
THE SIZE NEXUS: A GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Country Demographic 
size 
2003 
 
 
Population 
share in EU 
12 (in %) 
Economic 
size 
2003 
 
 
GDP level 
share in EU 
12 (in %) 
GDP per 
capita in 
2003 
 
 
Index 
EU 25=100
Real GDP 
growth 
 
 
 
Average 
1996-2004
Inflation 
 
 
 
 
Average 
1996-2004 
Public finance 
balance 
 
 
 
Average 
1996-2004 
 
Luxembourg  0.13 0.  32  213  5.19  2.07  2.15 
 
Ireland  1.2 1.46  136  7.73  3.14 1.13 
 
Portugal  3.36 1.56 77  2.54  2.88  -3.12 
 
Greece  3.51 1.87 81  3.89  4.09  -4.88 
 
Finland  1.7 2.06  113  3.62  1.57 2.24 
 
Austria  2.66 3.38  121  2.26  1.51  -0.63 
 
Belgium  3.39 3.86  117  2.16  1.71  -0.78 
 
Netherlands  5.13 5.98  126  2.41  2.44  -0.92 
Mean/median 
“small eight”  2.63/3.01 2.88/2.06 123/119  3.73/3.08  2.43/2.25 -0.60/-0.70 
 
Sweden∆  2* 3*  114  2.73  1.51  1.82 
 
Iceland and Norway  - -  131.15 3.47 2.44  4.56 
 
Italy  19.14 14.62 106 1.18  2.47  -3.02 
 
France  19.32 22.32 112 2.32  1.63  -3.03 
 
Germany  27.27 33.42 109 1.41  1.26  -3.04 
Mean/median 
 “big three”   21.91/19.32 23.4/22.32  109/109  1.64/1.41 1.79/1.63  -3.03/-3.03 
 
UK 
 
13* 
 
13* 
 
118 
 
2.89 
 
1.47 
 
-1.55 
 
USA and Canada85 
 
- 
 
- 
 
140.7 
 
3.3 
 
2.4 
 
-0.3 
 
Stand. dev. EU 11 
 
 
9.33 
 
10.97 
 
35.70 
 
1.90 
 
0.86 
 
2.37 
 
Source: Eurostat 
                                                           
∆ Sweden was chosen as the typical non-Euro area small country over Denmark because the latter is a member of the 
exchange rate mechanism II (ERM II). As such it is closer to the third-phase of EMU (see Chart VIII). 
* In the EU 25. 
85 1996-2003 data.  
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Table VI 
THE “SIZE NEXUS”: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Table VI-A: size(s), openness and growth 
 
 
 
 
         Table VI-B: size and growth 
                                                          Dependent variable: growth rate of real GDP 1996-2004 
  (1) 
SIZE NEXUS  
 
(2)  
ENDOGENOUS 
(3) 
SOCIAL 
(4) 
GLOBAL 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
-0.119467** 
( 0.055102) 
 
-0.113155* 
 (0.053887) 
 
-0.099593** 
(0.042840) 
 
-0.102224*** 
(0.032271) 
 
GDP per capita level 
1995 
 
- 
-0.033993 
 (0.030799) 
 
 
- 
-0.042609** 
(0.016792) 
 
Productivity  
average 1996-2004 
 
- 
0.066970 
(0.043118) 
 
 
- 
0.059866** 
(0.022038) 
 
Social transfers  
by public administrations 
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
 
- 
0.246975 
 (0.227024) 
 
0.337888* 
(0.194458) 
 
Total expenditures  
by public administrations  
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.330765** 
(0.118488) 
 
-0.361905*** 
(0.099215) 
 
Constant 4.098371*** 
(0.655377) 
 
0.444848 
 (2.967036) 
 
15.85544*** 
(3.328531) 
 
14.09211*** 
(3.367158) 
 
Number of EU 12 countries  11  11  11  11 
Adjusted R-squared  0.34 
 
0.30 
 
0.66 
 
0.82 
 
 
                                                          Dependent variable: growth rate of real GDP 1996-2004 
  (1) 
DEMO. SIZE 
 
(2) 
ECO. SIZE 
(3) 
OPENNESS 
(4) 
SIZE & SIZE 
(5) 
OPEN * SIZE 
Demographic size 
Population 1993 
-0.119467** 
( 0.055102) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.295037 
(0.337969) 
 
 
- 
Economic size 
GDP 1993 
 
- 
-0.094372* 
(0.047522) 
 
 
- 
0.149349 
(0.283310) 
 
 
- 
Openness 
1995 
 
- 
 
- 
0.057511* 
(0.027953) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Openness * Demo. 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.005718** 
(0.002303) 
 
 
Number of EU 12 countries  11  11  11  11  11 
Constant 4.098371*** 
(0.655377) 
 
3.943648*** 
(0.641852) 
 
0.835909 
(1.232896) 
 
4.236735*** 
(0.732038) 
 
4.449751*** 
(0.699296) 
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.34 
 
0.30 
 
0.32 
 
0.20 
 
0.40 
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Table VI-C:  size and inflation  
                                                             Dependent variable: inflation rate average 1996-2004 
  (1) 
SIZE NEXUS 
(2) 
OPENNESS 
(3)  
REAL GROWTH 
(4) 
ECO. SIZE 
 
(5) 
OPEN * SIZE 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
 
-0.037899* 
(0.020308) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Economic size  
GDP 1993 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.035862** 
(0.015536) 
 
 
- 
Openness  
1995 
 
- 
0.011999 
 (0.012364) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Real GDP growth 
Average 1996-2004 
 
- 
 
- 
0.159782 
 (0.099710) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
Openness * Demo 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.001770* 
(0.000935) 
 
Constant 
 
2.573971*** 
(0.281189) 
 
1.667945** 
(0.793440) 
 
1.701791*** 
(0.373803) 
 
2.582737*** 
(0.245088) 
2.702412*** 
(0.330068) 
 
Number of EU 12 countries  8  8  8  8  8 
R-squared 
 
0.36 
 
0.13 
 
0.29 
 
0.47 
 
0.37 
 
 
 
Table VI-D:  size and public deficit 
                                                     Dependent variable: public finance balance average 1996-2004 
  (1) 
SIZE NEXUS 
(2) 
OPENNESS 
(3)  
REAL GROWTH 
(4) 
ECO. SIZE 
 
(5) 
OPEN * SIZE 
 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
 
-0.162605*** 
(0.053515) 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Economic size  
GDP 1993 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.126605** 
(0.049092) 
 
 
- 
Openness  
1995 
 
- 
0.077691** 
(0.032350) 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Real GDP growth 
Average 1996-2004 
 
- 
 
- 
0.776517*** 
(0.267822) 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Openness * Demo 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.007558*** 
(0.002312) 
 
Constant 0.454360 
 (0.664916) 
 
 
-4.214149** 
(1.486222) 
 
-3.293536*** 
(0.968026) 
 
0.243864 
 (0.695020) 
 
0.936114 
(0.734719) 
 
Number of EU 12 
countries 
10  10 10 10 
 
10 
 
R-squared 0.53 
 
0.41 
 
0.51 
 
0.50 
 
0.51 
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Table VI-E:  size and unemployment 
 
Dependent variable: unemployment rate average 1996-2004 
 (1) 
SIZE NEXUS 
 
(2) 
SIZE NEXUS VS. SOCIAL NEXUS 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
 
0.200113*** 
(0.066216) 
 
0.225346** 
(0.091045) 
 
Social transfers  
by public administrations 
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
-0.360709 
 (0.439331) 
 
Total expenditures  
by public administrations  
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
0.182733 
 (0.225272) 
 
Constant 4.754781*** 
(0.866414) 
 
1.451946* 
(6.549308) 
 
Number of EU 12 countries  9  9 
Adjusted R-squared  0.56 
 
0.39 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI-F:  size and long-term unemployment 
 
Dependent variable: long-term unemployment rate average 1996-2004 
 (1) 
SIZE NEXUS 
 
(2) 
SIZE NEXUS VS. SOCIAL NEXUS 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
 
0.114498** 
(0.044705) 
 
 
0.124990* 
(0.058325) 
 
Social transfers  
by public administrations 
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
-0.172626 
 (0.302924) 
 
Total expenditures  
by public administrations  
average 1996-2003 
- 0.092006 
 (0.158754) 
 
Constant 2.061090  ** 
(0.555452) 
 
0.286653 
 (4.477501) 
 
Number of EU 12 countries  10  10 
Adjusted R-squared  0.45 
 
0.22 
 
 
 
 
All regressions were estimated using OLS and data from Eurostat and OECD. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Individual coefficients *significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level or ***1% level. All Eurostat 
data are available at http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/. OECD “openness” data are available at 
http://www.oecd.org/  
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Chart XVIII 
A “SOCIAL NEXUS” IN THE EU 12? 
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Country 
 
Model 
 
Degree of  redistribution 
 
Actual rounded 
coefficient86 
 
Belgium Continental  3  1.8 
Germany Continental  3  1.8 
Greece Mediterranean  2  1.5 
Spain Mediterranean  2 1.5 
France Continental  3  1.8 
Ireland Liberal  1  1 
Italy Mediterranean  2  1.5 
Luxembourg Continental  3  1.8 
Netherlands Continental  3  1.8 
Austria Continental  3  1.8 
Portugal Mediterranean  2  1.5 
Finland Nordic  4  2 
 
  
 
Model 
Average 
Inter-model difference 
 
Intra-model difference 
 
Inter-model 
standard 
deviation 
 
Intra-model 
standard 
deviation 
 
Continental 6.1*  7.37  3.03 
Mediterranean 9.9*  8.12  3.38 
Liberal 6.4* 
Nordic 10.7* 
4.6 
 
  
 
2.3 
 
*Unemployment rate average 1996-2003, in %. 
                                                           
86Average social transfers by public administrations between 1996 and 2003, in % of GDP. Ireland=1, 
coefficient=model average. 
Sophisticated  
“social nexus” 
Unsophisticated 
 
 “social nexus”  
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Chart XIX 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” VS THE “SOCIAL NEXUS” 
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OLS regression without Greece and Finland.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 3. 9 
Coefficient significant at 1 %. 
 
 
 
Size and long-term unemployment
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OLS regression without Greece.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 2. 2 
Coefficient significant at 5 %. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
 
 
         “Small eight”                                “Big three”     
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Chart XX 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” VS THE “SOCIAL NEXUS” 
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Chart XXI 
IRELAND: EU’S FINEST  
 
 
The “rags to riches” European success story... 
Ireland's catch-up and...surpass
(Gdp per capita in 1990 dollars)
23 201
9 265
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Ireland Western Europe
 
Source: A. Madison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 2003). 
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...relying heavily on a flourishing single market driven external trade. 
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Source:  Economic Review and Outlook 2004, Ireland Department of Finance, accessed at 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications  and  Budgetary and Economic Statistics, Ireland 
Department of Finance, April 2005, accessed at http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications.  
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Chart XXII 
THE “BIG THREE” AND THE EU 12:  A BASIC DECOMPOSITION 
EU 12 2003 GDP 
in % per member state, in crescent order
 Big three 
71%
1%
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4%
22%
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34%
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Belgium
Netherlands
Spain
Italy
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Expenditure on 2003 German GDP + imports
in %  27%
15%
45%
13%
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Expenditure on 2003 French GDP + 
imports
in %
15%
8% 21%
56%
exports consumption
investment government
Expenditure on 2003 Italian GDP + 
imports
in %
15%
21%
15%
49%
consumption government investment exports
 
                                                       
Source: DESTATIS, INSEE and OECD.  
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Table VII 
SINGLE MARKET DEPENDENCE RATIOS IN THE EU 1587 IN 2003 
 
          
 
 
Total trade in GDP 
(2003)  
Dependence on Single market ratio 
 
    
EU trade in total trade 
(2003) 
    
Country 
  
  
 
 
      
UK 29,9    57    17,02   
Italy 26,4    61    16,1   
France 27,7 
 
68   18,8 
Independent  
 
Germany 35,8   64,8  23,1   
 
 
Sweden 43,5 
 
64,4   28,01   
Portugal 37,5    79,9   29,9   
Denmark 43,7   71,5   31,2 Dependent 
 
 
Austria 48,8 
 
77,2   37,6   
Netherlands 65,5   68,1   44,6   
Ireland 89,8    62,4    56,03   
Belgium 86,3 
 
75,1   64,8 
Hyper-
dependent 
Luxembourg 139,8    82,4    115,1   
            
 
Size and Dependence
R
2 = 0,2829
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Source: Eurostat and OECD. 
                                                           
87 Missing data for Finland. Spain and Greece are excluded.   
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Chart XXIII 
GERMANY AND THE “FROG STRATEGY” 
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Source: OECD. 
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                                                                        Chart XXIV 
INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY: OLD AND NEW TRADE-OFFS 
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Chart XXV 
THE RISE OF THE “SMALLS” IN THE EU 
Number of states by size in the EEC and the EU 
 
50%
*
60%
66%
76% 
 77%
0
5
10
15
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25
1 9 5 71 9 7 21 9 8 11 9 8 61 9 9 52 0 0 42 0 0 7
"Small(s)"
"Medium(s)"
"Large(s)"
2007: If Romania and Bulgaria eventually integrate the EU then.  
* Percentage of small states in the European Economic communities and EU. 
 
 
Note: A “small” EEC and then EU member state is defined as one with a population inferior to the fourth 
of the population of the biggest state. A “medium” state is defined as one with a population inferior to 
half of the population of the biggest state. “Large” states are those remaining.  
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Table VIII 
ECONOMIC SIZE VS POLITICAL SIZE WITHIN THE EU 12 
Country  Economic size 
(GDP in 2003)  
 
 
in % 
Political size 
(voting rights as of 2005 
i.e. Nice Treaty provisions) 
 
in % 
≈ Magnification  
(or minimization) 
 
Average political size 
economic size 
(or the opposite) 
 
 
ECB€ SGP% EU 
budget‰ 
 
Comp. 
policy
© 
Pol. 
size
∑ 
Laurent & 
Le Cacheux 
vs. 
(unanimity)
Using 
Banzhaf 
index88 
 
Luxembourg  0. 3 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-1 
 
4-1 
 
4-4 
 
4.8  X 16.2  (27.7) 1.3     X 4.3   
 
Ireland  1 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-2 
 
4-2 
 
4-4 
 
5.1  X 5.1     (8.3)   2.2      X 2.2 
 
Portugal  2 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-4 
 
4-3 
 
4-4 
 
5.4  X 2.7     (4.1) 3.7      X 1.8 
 
Greece  2 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-4 
 
4-3 
 
4-4 
 
5.4  X 2.7    (4.1)  3.7     X 1.8 
 
Finland  2 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-2 
 
4-2 
 
4-4 
 
5.1  X 2.5    (4.1)  2.2     X 1.1 
 
Austria  3 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-3 
 
4-2 
 
4-4 
 
5.2  X 1.7    (2.7)  3.1     X 1.03 
 
Belgium  4 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-4 
 
4-3 
 
4-4 
 
5.4  X 1.3     (2)  3.7     ÷ 1.08 
 
Netherlands  6 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-4 
 
4-4 
 
4-4 
 
5.6  ÷ 1.06  (X 1.4)  4         ÷ 1.5 
 
Spain  9 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-8 
 
4-7 
 
4-4 
 
6.1  ÷ 1.4   (1.08) 7.4      ÷ 1.2   
 
Italy  15 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-9 
 
4-11 
 
4-4 
 
7.1  ÷ 2.1    (1.8)  7.8       ÷ 1.9 
 
France  22 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-9 
 
4-11 
 
4-4 
 
7.1  ÷ 3.08   (2.6) 7.8      ÷ 2.8    
 
Germany 34 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-9 
 
4-14 
 
4-4 
 
7.4  ÷ 4.5     (4)  7.8      ÷  4.3 
 
                                                           
€ The two numbers correspond respectively to the ability of amending and enforcing monetary rules. The six 
members of the Executive board (that form the Governing Council of the ECB together with the twelve national 
bankers) are not included in this count. Unlike for instance ECJ judges, they are not supposed to be nominated (or 
to act) on a national basis. Still, another way of calculating the votes would be to divide only 66% among the 12 
member states (12 out of 18). However, we assume the remaining third to be “size-blind” as it should according to 
its mandate. This method would in any event be neutral for the value of coefficients in the last column. 
% Idem, but with respectively the Council’s ability to amend unanimously and implement by qualified majority the 
SGP. For the sake of simplification votes have been distributed among members of the EU 12. However, more than 
half of those votes actually belong to the other members of the EU 25, even the implementation of the “excessive 
deficit” procedure (a clear symptom of the lack of sovereignty of the EU 12 inside the EU 25, see Section 7). 
Romania and Bulgaria, included in the Nice Treaty agreement, are not taken into account here. 
‰ Ibidem, but with respectively the Council’s unanimity and the Parliament’s majority. The EU’s annual budget is 
jointly determined by the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament debates in two successive readings, and the 
budget does not come into force until it has been signed by the President of Parliament. The budgetary procedure or 
the budget’s content can not be amended without EU 25 members’ unanimity.  
© Competition policy is enforced by the Commission, where each of the EU 25 state has a representative.  
∑ Average of ECB, SGP, EU budget and competition policy. 
88 See note 43.  
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Table IX 
ECONOMIC SIZE VS POLITICAL SIZE WITHIN THE EU 25 
 
Country  Economic 
size 
(GDP in 
2003) 
 
 
in % 
Political size 
(voting rights as of 2005 
i.e. Nice Treaty provisions) 
 
in % 
≈ Magnification  
(or minimization) 
 
Average political size 
economic size 
(or the opposite) 
  Commission  Council
d Parliament 
 
Pol. 
size
∑ 
Laurent & 
Le Cacheux 
vs. 
(unanimity) 
Using 
Banzhaf 
index89 
Malta 0.03  4  1  1  2  X 66  (133)  0.9      X30 
Estonia 0.05  4  1 1  2  X 40   (80)  1.3      X26 
Latvia  0.07 4  1 1  2  X 28   (57)  1.3      X18.5
Lithuania  0.09 4  2 2  2.6  X 29   (44)  2.2      X 24 
Cyprus  0.1 4  1 1  2  X 20   (40)  1.3        X 13
Slovakia  0.2 4  2 2  2.6  X 13   (20)  2.2       X 11 
Slovenia 0.2  4  1 1  2  X 10   (20)  1.3       X6.5 
Luxembourg 0.2  4  1 1  2  X 10   (20)  1.3        X6.5
Hungary 1  4  4 3  3.6  X 3     (4)  3.7       X3.7 
Czech Rep.  1 4  4 3  3.6  X 3     (4)  3.7        X3.7
Ireland 1  4  2 2  2.6  X 2     (4)  2.2       X 2.2 
Portugal 1  4  4 3  3.6  X 3     (4)  3.7      X3.7 
Greece 1  4  4 3  3.6  X 3    (4)  3.7       X 3.7
Finland 2  4  2 2  2.6  X 1.3   (2)  2.2       X1.1 
Poland 2 4  8 7  6.3  X 3   (2)  7.4        X3.7
Denmark 2  4  2 2  2.6  X 1.3  (2)  2.2       X1.1 
Austria 3  4  3 2  3  X 1  (1.3)  3.1      X1.03
Sweden 3  4  3 3  3.3  X 1.1 (1.3)  3.1      X1.03
Belgium 3  4  4 3  3.5  X 1.2 (1.3)  3.7      X1.23
Netherlands 5  4  4 4  4.25  ÷1.25 (1.25)  4        ÷ 1.25   
Spain 7  4  8 7  6.5  ÷1.10 (1.75)  7.4      ÷ 0.9 
Italy 11  4  9 11  8.75  ÷1.3 (2.75)  7.8       ÷1.4 
UK 13  4  9  11  9.25  ÷  1.6 (3.25)  7.8      ÷1.6 
France 17 4  9  11  10.25  ÷  2.1 (4.25)  7.8      ÷2.1 
Germany 26  4  9  14  13.25  ÷  2.8 (6.5)  7.8       ÷3.3 
 
 
                
                                                           
d A qualified majority in the Council is reached under the Nice rules:  if a majority of member states (in some cases a 
two-thirds majority) approve; if a minimum of 232 votes (72.3 percent of the total) is cast in favor; if the votes 
represent at least 62 percent of the total population of the Union. 
∑ Average of Commission, Council and Parliament. 
89 Index built on population shares and representing the proportion of times a member state is pivotal in decision-
making, see Bobay (2004). Romania and Bulgaria are not counted here.  
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Table X 
ECONOMIC SIZE VS POLITICAL SIZE  
IN THE EU 12 AND EU 25 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Economic size 
 
% of GDP 
 
Political size 
 
% of votes 
 
  Council 
 
Banzhaf indexes  Laurent & Le Cacheux 
      
EU 25  ≈100  ≈100  ≈100  ≈100 
Political 
majority  82 52  46.3  55.7 
79 48  42.6  52.2 
74 44  38.6  48 
 
67 36  31.2  41.5 
Economic 
majority  56 27  23.4  32.7 
  43 18  15.6  23.5 
 
 
 
 
EU 12  ≈100  ≈60 (majority 30)  ≈55 (majority 27.5)  ≈70 (majority 35) 
Political 
majority  80 35  30.8  27.8 
 
71 27  23.4  21.7 
Economic 
majority  56 18  15.6  14.6 
 
34 9 7.8  7.4 
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Table XI 
THE US 13 IN 1787:  
WELL BALANCED AND READY FOR THE “GREAT COMPROMISE” 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
                        in thousands 
 
State               Population* 
 
 
Delaware                            59 
Rhode Island                               68.8 
Georgia         82.5 
New  Hampshire            141.8 
New  Jersey         184.1 
 
                
Connecticut         237.9 
South  Carolina         249 
 
 
Maryland         319.7 
New  York         340.1 
Massachusetts         378.7 
North  Carolina         393.7 
Pennsylvania         434.3 
Virginia         747.6 
 
 
 
 The first 13 American colonies.                                                * As of 1790, the first US Census. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A “Small” state is defined as one with a population inferior to the fourth of the population of the 
biggest state. A “Medium” state is defined as one with a population inferior to half of the population of 
the biggest state. “Large” states are those remaining. 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, extracted from a table available at www.infoplease.com. 
   «LARGE»  
    (6) 
«MEDIUM» 
(2) 
186 
   
373 
   «SMALL»  
    (5)  
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Chart XXVI 
THE OPTIMAL EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION(S) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Buchanan and Tullock (1962).  
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